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THE COLONIES AND THE CENTURY



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BY THE
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LATE PREMIER OF NATAL

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NOTE

A CONSIDERABLE portion of this little volume was read by the Author before the Royal Colonial Institute, on May 9th last, but want of time compelled the omission of much that is now incorporated.



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THE EMPIRE IN 1800.

JUST thirty years have passed since it fell to my lot to read before the Royal Colonial Institute, then in the first year of its existence, a paper on "The Social Aspects of Colonisation." It was associated with another, more statistical in its character, upon "The Progress of the Colonies," which I had been asked to read during the same week before the Society of Arts. Strange as it may now seem that such an attempt should even then have been thought necessary, the object of both papers was to vindicate the work of British colonisation, and to prove by facts and figures that the colonies had contributed in the past, and would continue to contribute in the future, to the prosperity and advantage of the parent land. Nothing can more vividly demonstrate the change that has come over public opinion in this regard than the fact that in 1869 it was possible in sober seriousness to use these words : "Over and over again it is asserted that the colonies

are no substantial gain to the Empire ; that England would be better without than with them ; that they cost more than they are worth ; that they are not only a drain upon the Imperial Exchequer, but a constant source of difficulty to Imperial Statesmen."

Happily for us all, there is no reason now, in 1899, to confute these propositions by elaborate statistics or laborious arguments. Except in one or two quarters where timeworn fallacy dies hard, or where conviction born even of facts seems naught but heresy, it is needless in these days to justify the existence of the colonist. No longer can the colonist, when revisiting the mother-country, regard himself as a pariah or an alien. No longer need he seek to hide his identity, or slur over his association with things colonial. No longer is there any misunderstanding in the national mind of England's true might or of England's chief mission. The task which falls to me now is far lighter and more gracious than that which I essayed to perform when my voice seemed as that of one crying in the wilderness of callous indifferentism or of hostile disregard.

I desire at the end of this fast dying century to show by a few swift outlines how the colonies have developed, what the colonies have become, and whither the colonies seem tending. I wish to indicate briefly, but as clearly as may be, the part which the colonies have played in the progress of the Empire

and in the civilisation of the world since the nineteenth century began, and what the promise of their future seems to be as the twentieth century begins.

In doing this, one is fortunately absolved from recourse to wearisome statistics by the fact that none of much practical value are available for the first half of the century. The printed records of the Colonial Office only begin with the year 1851, and any complete comparison of trade and revenue returns during the past and the present must start from that date, so far as the last half of the century is concerned. The able paper read by that eminent authority, Sir Robert Giffen, before the Institute in February last, gave so luminous a view of the Empire's progress during the three last decades, that it is only requisite to refer very briefly to such figures as may seem to illustrate the position of the Colonial Empire a hundred years ago.

The map of the world as it appeared to the observer's eye at that time best tells the tale of colonial expansion. The red patches which now proclaim the spread of British dominion from north to south and from east to west were then confined to relatively small areas in North-Eastern America, in the Caribbean Gulf, in Hindostan, and then as now, happily, in these northern seas. These were one or two so-called "settlements" on the West African and Australian coasts, but they could hardly be considered "colonies." The vast spaces of

Australasia, of South Africa, of Northern India and Burmah, of Northern and Western Canada, and of many island possessions amidst the seas, were all blank or alien. They were unknown to civilisation, to commerce, or to society. They contributed naught to the wealth or progress of mankind. Known only to the scanty or savage or unlettered peoples who roamed their wilds or tenanted their untravelled depths, they were spheres of curiosity or conjecture, rather than of influence or activity. Scenes of myth or mystery, they were the prey of inventive chronicler or fanciful fable-monger. Travellers said what they liked concerning regions where their pens and pencils could confidently run riot in imaginative exaggerations. Though there are notable exceptions in the way of truthful narration, the books and prints of that period too often bear amusing testimony to the unbridled freedom with which visitors to distant and unknown countries exercised their descriptive faculties. Then, as now, the *De Rougemonts* of the press found an ample and a credulous auditory.

In 1799 it cannot be said that colonisation in its later sense was more than a name. The plantations and settlements of North America and the Indies had ceased for the time being to attract any large migration of British colonists, and the wars of the period absorbed the cares and interests of Englishmen. Though Burke's magnificent appeals and fore-

casts still vibrated in the political atmosphere, the British nation was insensible of the high destiny before it. Its interests and its solitudes were confined in the main to the parent islands. India was looming large in the Eastern horizon, but it was more as a fantastic dreamland of distant conquests and fabled wealth than as a sphere of practical Empire and commercial development. America was identified with political failure and too frequent military reverse. The shadow of slavery darkened British rule in the West Indies. I find from tables compiled in 1839 by Mr. Montgomery Martin that in 1800 the area of Greater Britain comprised a little over two million square miles, with a white population of two millions, and a coloured population of 98 millions; with an export trade of 30 millions, and an import trade of $25\frac{1}{2}$ millions, of which a proportion of 24 millions was done with the mother country. The combined revenues of these territories amounted to 22 millions, and their expenditure to 25 millions. Such, in figures, was the British Empire a century ago. Fifty years later the whole area of Greater Britain covered in square miles only a million in India, $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions in Australia, 632,000 in Canada, 125,000 in Africa, 76,000 in South America, and 121,000 in various islands of the sea. At that time the British Empire outside these seas represented, in round figures, $4\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles of territory, a

population of a combined trade of 65 millions sterling, and a revenue of 31 millions, of which India alone contributed 27½ millions.

But if mere statistics concerning the earlier period are not easily obtainable, other facts more germane to my purpose are quite apparent. Whatever the economic conditions of England's colonies a century ago may or may not have been, not one of those regions was self-governed. They were all in tutelage. They were all not merely in leading strings, but actually under the direct rule of the Crown. There was a form of legislative procedure in some of them, but of representation and responsible government as we understand it in these days—of the free, full, pulsating, political life which now, with few exceptions, vitalises and invigorates the colonial communities of the Empire, nothing whatever was known. Society was none the stronger for their activity; freedom was none the richer for their existence. That portion of the New World which had burst its bonds breathed freely, but elsewhere the Anglo-Saxon colonist ceased when he left England to exercise the rights of citizenship, while his children in their new homes could claim no equality of privilege with their cousins beyond the sea.

This absence of local freedom—this degradation of political status—seems to me the one overpowering fact which differentiates any view we may take of the

colonies at the birth of the century from that which meets us at its close. It was opposed to all natural law. It was in arrest of the march of man. That a free country should be the parent of fettered communities was an anachronism that was bound to end. That England, the shrine and home of freedom, should be mocked by dependencies to whom liberty was but a name—that the

“ Brave mother of a lion line ”

should have for offspring in distant lands races of political serfs or poodles, was in itself a state of things so abnormal that the marvel is that it lasted so far into the nineteenth century.

An explanation of the fact may be found in another coincident condition. Apart from Canada, where the desire for freedom was already fermenting, and from India, which is not a colony in the strict sense of the term, such colonies as England possessed a century ago were dependent upon slave labour for their industrial development. Prior to 1820, slavery, except in British North America, was identified with colonisation. The West Indies flourished under the benignant auspices of that domestic institution. For many years the settlers of the Cape Colony depended upon it for manual and domestic labour. Traffic in human flesh, however repugnant to our ideas in these days, was an accepted and legalised fact in those

regions. British consumers of sugar and of rum swallowed both without a qualm as to the genesis of either. The fact was also associated with a further circumstance that must not be overlooked. The white residents of these tropical colonies—I again exempt Canada and the Cape from the category—were not colonists in the true sense of the term. They were mostly agents or representatives of absentee proprietors, who lived at home upon the proceeds of their oversea possessions. They were birds of passage to whom colonial life meant a period of probation or exile. That sense of transplanted patriotism to which I shall have occasion to refer more fully, was to them unknown. The colony was not the land of their adoption, but a place to make money out of and to hurry back from, whenever their term of sojourn in it might arrive.

Crown government, slave labour, and absentee proprietorship thus conspired to mar the aspect of British colonisation in the early years of this century. Those three great principles of action—self-sacrifice, self-help, and self-government—which have done so much in later years to mould the character of British colonists, and shape the destinies of British colonies—had little part in the process of Empire building at that time. They had been magnificently exemplified in the experiences of the American provinces and in the evolution of the young Republic that had so

lately won its freedom. But as yet they had to be developed elsewhere. After the War of Independence a political reaction seemed to set in throughout the rest of England's colonial possessions. The gloom of stagnation and listlessness rested upon the outer Anglo-Saxon world. The excitements of war were followed by a season of apathy and depression. Oppressive laws and grinding imposts crushed enterprise and stifled industry. The national spirit languished and the popular temper fretted under disabilities and burdens. Trade struggled and progress dragged. But light was coming; better times were drawing near. Not only in the mother land were the forces of regeneration and emancipation working onward, but beyond the ocean the territories where freedom was to have her amplest fields were creeping into view. Prophetic in a sense he little wot of was Shelley when he wrote :

“Regions which groan beneath the Antarctic stars,
The green lands cradled in the roar
Of western waves, and wildernesses
Peopled and vast, which skirt the oceans
Where morning dyes her golden tresses
Shall soon partake our high emotions.”

In 1806 the Cape Colony was added to Great Britain. In 1810 Mauritius was annexed. In 1814 British Guiana was incorporated. In 1868 Australia altogether ceased to be a penal settlement, and be-

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tween 1835 and 1851 the colonies of South Australia, New Zealand, Victoria, and Queensland were established. In 1843 Natal came under British rule. In 1834 slavery was abolished throughout British dominions; and in 1846 the first responsible government was constituted in Canada. During the fourth decade of the century the stream of emigration from the British islands began to flow west and south. Beginning as usual with a gentle flow, the current of outward-going population rapidly swelled and quickened, until, before the first half of the century had closed, over three millions of people had transplanted themselves to the soil of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Ten years later the volume had increased to $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Twenty years later the numbers were $7\frac{1}{2}$ millions. To-day, at the century's end, the population of these three groups of territories is approximately estimated at 12 millions, while their combined trade represents an aggregate value of 247 millions sterling.

THE COLONIES IN 1900.

WE have seen what her colonies were to Great Britain when the century began. Let us now scan them as they are to-day when the century has run its course. In drawing the first picture one was hampered by the paucity of materials—by the meagreness of the subject. It was only possible to give outlines,

and these not by any means definite or complete. The scope of the sketch, as we see by the map, was neither imposing nor comprehensive. Very different is the case now. We are embarrassed by the amplitude of the picture. We are overwhelmed by the redundancy of details. The vastness of the view—the variety of its aspects—the multiplicity of its features—all render the task of delineation difficult within the brief compass available. Sir Robert Giffen's figures, however, are so copious and exhaustive that they render it unnecessary to enter the field of detailed statistics. For purposes of comparison it suffices to look at the broad final results.

A glance at the map at once shows how the colonial Empire has spread itself out over the globe's surface during the hundred years. It is literally world-embracing. No longer confined to a patch in North America, to a patch in Hindostan, and to a few dots in the Caribbean sea, it stretches from the extreme north to the extreme south, from the far west to the furthest east. It comprehends the frigid regions that skirt the Arctic Ocean, the bracing latitudes of the temperate zone, and the sun-scorched breadths of the tropics. It is represented in each of the five continents, and it comprises one of them altogether. Throughout all the oceans it has outposts in the form of habitable islands, where the flag of England offers kindly greeting to all the commerce of

mankind. It is an enkindling and ennobling spectacle and it is so, as I hope to show, in a sense that far transcends any common or vulgar view of mere territorial aggrandisement or national expansion. Its only counterpart in the history of the world was the Roman Empire, but it was in point of area but a babe by comparison. It spanned Europe, it took in parts of Western Asia, it fringed North Africa, Greater Britain encircles, though happily for her statesmen, it neither absorbs nor dominates, the habitable globe. It will be an evil day both for them and for her were they to seek to do so. World domination by any one race or power would be a calamity to either and to mankind. Any overleaping ambition of that sort would inevitably defeat itself and end as Rome's did in disruption and collapse. So long as humanity is cast in different moulds—so long as civilisation is represented by different races—so long as diversity of origin, language, tradition, and custom distinguishes people from people, and government from government, so long must the nations of the earth be content to recognise the limits of each other's heritage.

But before pursuing this proposition further, let us continue our survey of the colonies as they now exist. They are, as regards area, six times more extensive than they were in 1800. Their united population is three and one-third times greater than

it was then. Of that population about eleven millions are of European origin. These Europeans comprise persons of Dutch, German, French, Norwegian, as well as British descent. Taking in the Indian Empire the coloured population includes Indians, Cingalese, Malays, and Chinese, Africans, Arabs, and natives of Australia and Polynesia. The whole of these races may be classified as regards religion into Christians, Mussulmans, Hindus, Buddhists, and heathen. It is not necessary to descend to a more minute classification. The divisions named suffice to show what a cosmos the British Empire is; what a tolerant and all-embracing power it has become. All these races and creeds, all these varieties of belief or unbelief—all these people of alien stocks, of conflicting faiths, of differing colour, of many tongues, live in the full enjoyment of peace, liberty, law, and order, secure in life and property, in freedom of person, in equality of religious privilege, in loyal obedience to government, in implicit command of justice under the British flag.

TRADE.

The whole trade of the United Kingdom in 1897 represented a grand total of 745 millions, of which imports represented 451 millions and exports 294 millions. The imports from foreign countries amounted to 357 millions, against 94 millions from

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British possessions. In 1800 the imports were roughly estimated at $28\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and the exports $34\frac{1}{2}$ millions; but the imports from India and the colonies did not exceed 14 millions. It will thus be seen that the trade done by Outer Britain with the mother country has made enormous strides as the century has advanced. Starting from comparatively nominal figures, it has reached an approximate total of 181 millions. It is proper, however, to take a yet larger view of the question by estimating the entire aggregate of trade done in all the possessions of the Empire. In 1896 the figures were as follows: the imports with India and the colonies were 241 millions; the exports from them were 229 millions, making a grand total of 470 millions, or two-thirds that of the United Kingdom. Of this aggregate the mother country contributes 87 millions in the shape of goods sent to her over-sea possessions, while she draws from them produce valued at 94 millions.

The people of Great Britain in these days are supplied largely with many of the necessities of life by their colonial fellow-subjects. Meat, grain, and fruit from Australia; meat, grain, cheese, butter, eggs, and fruit from Canada; sugar from the West Indies, Mauritius, Queensland and Natal; tea and coffee from India, Ceylon and Natal; wine from Australia and the Cape, are but some of the commodities that

help to cheapen the food of the home consumer. Manufacturers of woven fabrics are supplied with wool and hair from Australia and South Africa, with cotton, jute, and flax from India and New Zealand. South Africa, Canada, and Australia contribute the bulk of the world's gold supply; South Africa and Ceylon supply diamonds and precious stones. From Western Australia timber is largely exported; while oil, tobacco, and spices are but some of the minor staples which in lesser volume help to swell the list. Of a truth it may be said with incomparably greater reason now than existed forty years ago that—

“All of use
That one fair planet can produce,
Brought from under every star,
Blown from over every main”—

passes daily from the distant harbours of the Empire to supply the needs, to employ the hands, and to enrich the purses of the people of these overflowing islands.

The much debated question as to whether or not trade follows the flag cannot be dealt with here, except in a cursory fashion. In spite of what high authorities have said to the contrary, it would not be difficult to prove by figures that, given equality of conditions, trade does follow the flag. Twenty years ago I was able to write as follows :—

“In 1851, India and the colonies were customers

of the United Kingdom to the extent of 20 millions of British goods, or something more than one-fourth of her whole export trade. In 1866 these possessions had increased their consumption of British manufactures threefold ; and out of the exports from the United Kingdom that year, amounting in round numbers to 188 millions, 61 millions, or one-third, went to the colonies. Thus, so far from the colonies becoming worse customers of the mother country as they advance in years and productive power, they have, in fifteen years, increased their proportion of trade by a very considerable percentage."

So much for the state of things at that time. Thirty years later we find the comparison to be as follows. In 1897, the total exports of Great Britain were 294 millions sterling. Of this vast amount, 87 millions were absorbed by Outer Britain. England's best customers, it will thus be seen, are relatively and proportionately, her own off-spring. So far, at any rate, trade has followed the flag ; and it has done so without recourse to any coercive legislation, to any preferential tariff, or to any other abnormal influence. The commerce of the Empire has naturally gravitated towards the country from which it sprung. How far it will do so in the future will depend more, I believe, upon the energy and enterprise of home manufacturers, upon the self-restraint and common sense of home operatives,

than upon special measures or restrictive compacts.

We must not, however, confine the survey to the export trade of Great Britain only. It is not less accurate now than it was in 1869 to say, as I did then, that "of even greater consequence, in a national point of view, than her export business is the import trade of the Kingdom. The commodities she gets from her colonies are mostly raw materials, which give employment in so many countless forms to the labouring millions of her population, and the vast capital of her manufacturers. British colonisation benefits the mother country in two ways : it opens out new fields for the energy and industry of her sons, for the enterprise and wealth of her capitalists ; but it also, by the extended production of raw staples, which that energy and that capital stimulate, quickens the industry of her toilers, and gives fresh and continued vitality to her own manufacturing interests. How many hands are employed, how much capital and machinery is engaged in converting into marketable commodities the cotton, wool, flax, timber, hides, sugar, spices and other staples, sent to the ports of the United Kingdom from her colonial possessions ? These materials are the lifeblood of British commerce, and are pouring in year by year in a gradually dilating stream. In 1851 the total imports of Great Britain amounted to 142 millions of which 20 millions came from her colonies. In 1866

this country's importations were estimated at 295 millions, and of this amount 74 millions were colonial shipments. In fifteen years, therefore, England's importations from her colonies, as compared with the aggregate of her imports, advanced from one-seventh to one-fourth."

Again we leap over a span of years ; but this time it is thirty, not fifteen years, and these are the results : In 1897, immediately preceding the penultimate year of the century, Great Britain's import trade reached the total value of 451 millions. Of this 94 millions came from India and the colonies. During thirty years the contribution of Greater Britain had increased by about one-third ; its proportion to the whole was one-fifth. Though the ratio of increase has declined, the volume of business done shows no shrinkage.

These vast results, these fast multiplying figures, have been attained in despite of hostile processes on the part of other nations. They have been reached through the open door of free competition and unfettered trade. England imposes no duties upon her exports ; neither does any one of her colonies. England sets a noble example to her progeny by reducing her own customs' tariff to the lowest limit compatible with national existence. Though the colonies have been compelled by revenue needs to adopt less liberal tariffs and to raise income by indirect, in preference to direct, taxation, they have

done so in a broad and liberal spirit, without distinction between race and race. Their ports are open alike to all. Their tariffs fall equally upon all nations. No preference is given to any. Other countries have not been slow to avail themselves of these opportunities. American and German manufactures especially are vigorously pushed in colonial markets, and are specially adapted by the care and intelligence of their manufacturers in many cases to meet the requirements of colonial consumers. But still the home—the British—product holds its own and makes its way—still the large bulk of colonial produce flows to home markets—and as the century closes it can still be said that the British consumer, whether at home or in the colonies, is the best customer of the British producer.

REVENUE AND DEBT.

So much for trade. Let us now glance at revenue. Although the fluctuations of national income do not as fully as in other countries reflect the growth or decline of colonial wealth, they are undoubtedly an indication of prosperity or depression. In 1800 the revenue of India was 20 millions; in 1850 it was 27½ millions. In 1897 it was 60 millions. In 1850 the aggregate revenue raised by all other British possessions amounted only to 3 millions and two-thirds. In 1897 that aggregate was not less than

54 millions. In fifty years the sum total of income throughout the colonies had increased thirteenfold. Fifty years ago the colonies received into their exchequers about one-fifteenth of the amount of the national income. To-day the proportion is a trifle less than one-half.

Still more remarkable is the expansion of the colonial debt. In 1851 the public debt of India amounted to 55 millions; it is now 235 millions. During the same period the combined indebtedness of the colonies advanced from $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions to 334 millions, or nearly half of that of the United Kingdom. This stupendous fact—that Greater Britain owes, mainly to British bondholders, a sum roundly estimated at 670 millions sterling, may, perhaps, be regarded by political pessimists with foreboding, if not dismay. But what does it mean? A stifling load of national obligation, do you answer?—a crushing burden upon national energies? an exhaustion of national resources, of national strength? Nothing of the kind. This huge aggregate of funded debt, which gives the holder of every pound's worth of stock a vested interest in the colonial Empire of Great Britain means life, expansion, progress, commercial development, and industrial activity throughout one-fourth of the world's surface. It means 36,000 miles of railway, giving employment to, who shall say how many hands of British subjects, carrying how many

tons of merchandise and produce, conveying yearly how many millions of passengers, and opening up how many thousands of square miles of territory in and through territories which fifty years ago were untrodden and unmapped wildernesses? It means safe and deepened harbours on coasts which not long ago were inaccessible to the shipping of the world. It means the bridging of previously impassable rivers and the construction of hard and easy roads in remote and rugged regions. It means the supply of wholesome water in adequate quantity to localities which were otherwise uninhabitable for the want of it, and of facilities for irrigation in desert places which only needed them in order to blossom as the rose. It means the erection in far off countries of Government offices and Parliament houses, of courts of justice and post-offices, of schools, universities, and libraries, of town-halls, museums, and prisons. It means the provision of forts and batteries for the defence of exposed shores and centres, the construction of lighthouses for the protection of passing ships. It means the reclamation of waste lands, the exploration of mining areas, the diffusion of electric energy for purposes of light and locomotion. It means, in a word, the awakening into life and activity of a sleeping world. These millions of colonial debt are not, like the millions of old-world national debts, the outcome and equivalent of wasteful wars. They are

rather a solid investment of capital applied to eminently reproductive purposes, yielding not only in most cases a substantial monetary return in the shape of interest actually earned, but yielding also, in a measure that cannot be expressed by figures, benefits of incomparable value to mankind at large.

GOVERNMENT.

Reference has already been incidentally made to the gradual evolution of self-government throughout the colonies. It was only in 1846 that the first gift of responsible government was made to any colony. To Canada, as was fitting in the case of England's eldest daughter, and the immediate neighbour of the enfranchised Republic, belonged the honour of leading the way in the path of colonial self-rule. Since then the application of the principle of policy then wisely, though not too confidently, resolved upon has been steady and continuous. If there was hesitancy in the minds of imperial statesmen forty years ago on this subject, there is none now. All parties in the State are agreed as to the wisdom and beneficence of the policy. Wherever self-government can be granted without evident or flagrant peril to the State, it is granted. Whenever a colonial community earnestly pleads for the boon, it is certain to be granted. In the case with which I am most familiar, any delay in

accepting the change came rather from local reluctance than from imperial opposition. All the three great groups of colonies are now wholly responsible for the control of their own affairs. Canada, Australasia and South Africa possess Constitutions which, I make bold to submit, secure to their peoples the fullest measure of freedom enjoyed at this moment throughout the world. I am not aware of any Republic in which the principle of autonomy is more completely developed and applied than in any of these colonies. In bestowing the gift of freedom imperial statesmen have done so in no half-hearted or ungenerous fashion. They have been scrupulously loyal to the spirit which inspired the gift. Whatever caution or reserve may at first have been shown in carrying out the system, years have passed since any serious attempt at undue interference with the powers of a colonial administration occurred. Seldom, if ever, do we now hear of any sustained friction between a Governor and his Ministers, or between the Colonial Office in Downing Street and its counterparts abroad. Were the first untoward incident to happen, without altogether overpowering reason to sustain him, I fear that any Governor to whom such a misfortune might come would be the first to suffer in the encounter. It is quite certain that should serious contention over privilege arise between the Crown and the colony, the latter would

not in the end be denied in the pursuit of a proper constitutional end. This smoothness of working in inter-imperial relationships is attributable, I believe, to the salutary influences of responsibility. Among men of Anglo-Saxon origin, to be responsible is to be sedate. Circumspection is the offspring of duty, and a sense of duty is inseparable from a consciousness of active and actual power. The noisiest demagogue is apt to be curbed and stilled by the restraints of office. When confronted by the imminent risk of definite consequences, or even of indefinite possibilities, the most clamant agitator is sobered and his action moderated. Where party government prevails the oppositionist knows that he may be called upon to-morrow to give effect to the professions of to-day.

The several Constitutions of the self-governing colonies are a stimulating study to any statesman who likes variety of form and originality of treatment. Apart from the central principle of self-rule—most piously safeguarded in every instance—there is no structural uniformity about them. The foundation of all representative government, the franchise, differs not less than the superstructure, though rather in material than in strength or solidity. From manhood suffrage, pure and simple, the electoral qualification advances to a property test of £10 per annum, or to an educational test of ability to read and write. The qualification of members increases from the mere

acquisition of the franchise, or from the fact of registration, to the possession of property worth £50 or £100. Yet more divergent is the composition of the Second, or Upper, Chamber, the existence of which is yet held to be a necessity, even in these young democratic communities. The instinctive cautiousness of the Anglo-Saxon is aptly exemplified in the tenacity with which these conservative checks in the political fabric are maintained. Although it is the fashion to rail against the "fossil Chamber," irreverently so-called—whenever it may choose to exercise its proper function as a brake-power—there is a most significant reluctance to abolish its existence whenever such a proposal may be advanced. Even when these bodies consist wholly of nominees—in some instances for life—assemblies and electorates hesitate before they set up a more popular method of creation. But whether the principle of nomination or of election—of appointment for life or for a term of years—of election by circles or by special franchise-holders be adopted—the salutary effect remains the same. Demos is given time for second thoughts—the popular voice has to be expressed again and again—before any revolutionary or seriously contentious measure can come into operation.

The policy steadfastly pursued by Great Britain in granting the full privileges of self-government to her colonies has been completely justified by results.

This is sufficiently demonstrated by the absence of serious difference between the imperial or any colonial Government. During the last thirty years I can recall no crisis that could fairly be called acute. Controversy has never threatened to ripen into conflict. Rumblings of discontent may now and then have been heard, but actual storms have been unknown in the political firmament. Questions of State policy have at times aroused angry feeling, but they have not once been carried beyond the region of constitutional discussion. Timely concession on one side has met with temperate acceptance on the other. No thought of rupture has at any time been cherished. Solidarity of interest, and the sentiment of kinship, have bound mother-country and daughter-land together. Is it wrong to assume that the old community and the young community have both benefited by their mutual relationship—that the views of home statesmen have been broadened by the oversight of a vast empire beyond the seas—that the minds of colonial statesmen have been tempered and mellowed by their duties towards a distant Sovereign and an ancient throne?

Let us think for a moment what the world has gained by the outgrowth of British colonisation during the present century. No one will desire to deny that these new and rising States in America, in Africa, and in Australasia are the homelands of the

future—the swarming places of the race. It is in them that the new and more vigorous life of the next century and its successors will be centred. If the new world is to “redress the balance of the old,” then it is therein that the latest developments and places of human activity will be found. Regions—unknown to our grandfathers—will be the scenes of a civilisation that may be yet in embryo. If the progress of scientific discovery and development during the coming century is foreshadowed by the progress that has distinguished the century now closing, it is impossible to predict or to conceive what marvels may be in store. How fortunate it is, therefore—how auspicious an augury for mankind—that these new lands should have been reclaimed from barbarism by—that these new nationalities should advance towards maturity under—a power that has thus nurtured and developed the governing instincts of a free people. It is in no spirit of national self-rectitude that this circumstance is referred to. No disparagement of other races is thereby implied. I only mention the fact as one that cannot be ignored in this rapid survey. It might have been otherwise. Another policy might have prevailed. Our colonies might have been abandoned—at one time a distinct possibility—and become the prey of other powers. They might have been kept under the heel of a foreign despotism, or crushed within

the swaddling clothes of paternal rule. Political tutelage might have stifled all national aspiration, or deadened all patriotic capacity. Or another fate might have been theirs. They might have drifted rudderless into the tumultuous waters of premature Republicanism. Left to shift altogether for themselves they might have been the sport of faction and anarchy, and have lost, in the perilous excesses of unbridled party strife, the well-ordered liberty they now enjoy. That they have been saved from either alternative is wholly due to the fact that they have been linked by free but well-balanced Constitutions to this island home of law-abiding citizens, this

“ Land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom slowly broadens down
From precedent to precedent.”

Another phase of the subject deserves consideration. The colonies have been a great training school of statesmanship and administrators. In those that are self-governed, there are thirty-one Chambers of Legislature, though the number of legislative bodies in all the colonies reaches a total of fifty-two. It does not matter whether they are Upper or Lower Houses—conservative bodies or popular assemblies—nominated or elective: the educational influence is the same. These Parliaments and Legislatures com-

prise an aggregate of 2,000 members. The composition of the popular assemblies is ever changing, as older men disappear and new ones come forward. As a rule the qualification is low enough to give access to any man of intelligence or ordinary respectability who can command the confidence of his fellow electors. It is not necessary to consider here the effect which ease of entry into parliamentary life produces upon legislative work and conduct. It must never be forgotten that the colonies are in the nature of things democratic communities, and that their institutions are more or less subject to democratic influences, reflecting in a greater degree than is the case in older countries, democratic modes and methods.¹ They are also young and relatively imma-

¹ In 1869 I wrote :—Self-government in the Colonies works under the peculiar condition of having republican elements to deal with under a monarchical head. In a social sense, a colony is a reproduction upon a small scale of the American republic. There are practically no hereditary titles, no landed aristocracy, no social grades, save such as money, ability, or taste suggest. Prescription is unknown. The rich man, the ready man, the fortunate man, may rise to the top of the social tree, but no man can do so without one or another of these claims to recognition. In some colonies, perhaps, accident or custom may have brought about a certain social distinction of classes, such as exists between town-people and country-people, tradesmen and farmers, but the division thus created can be regarded neither as material nor permanent. Unless there be some especial personal disqualification, the opportunities of social advancement and of wealth-getting are about equal, to the ambi-

ture. The set and solid fibre of the parent stem ought not to be looked for in the suppler and up-shooting sapling. The staid demeanour of age cannot fairly be expected in youth-time. All things considered, it is surprising that legislative exuberances are not more frequent and flagrant. One reads, indeed, now and then of scenes and episodes distinguishing legislatorial proceedings in certain lands of ancient and historical renown, which have no counterpart in the records of any colonial Assembly. And for a very good reason. All colonial Parliaments have been most scrupulous in walking in the footsteps of their august mother. Their rules and their procedure are modelled on the pattern of the British Houses. There may be divergencies here and there to meet local exigencies or circumstances, but the example set by the Home Legislature is followed with a filial fidelity that is alike touching and significant. The colonies know how well and bravely the British Constitution has borne the shocks of revolution and the strain of centuries. They know how it has weathered every crisis, survived every vicissitude, proved equal to every call for action. They know how it has grown with the ages, and been readjusted by the wisdom of its guardians, to the needs of each passing

ous and to the capable man ; and it is difficult to say whether the time may come that shall see the general recognition of superiority by birth awarded to any one class.

time. Only when you review the progress of Anglo-Saxon colonisation can you fully realise all that Anglo-Saxon freedom has been to the world, in its abounding manifestations of law and liberty :—

“Grave mother of majestic works,
From her isle altar gazing down,
Who, God-like, grasps the triple forks,
And, king-like, wears the crown,”—

And wears it, because, as we colonists never cease to remember—

“Her open eyes desire the truth,
The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them.”

STATE ACTIVITY.

It must not, however, be supposed that while the colonies are thus loyal in abiding by the practice and precedents of the Home Parliament, they are slavishly imitative in doing so. Every one of them has its own conditions, and local necessities may enjoin the propriety of local modifications to meet them. Rules of order are constantly being amended as occasion arises, but the process is always conducted in view of the parent model. The sober and conservative spirit that has at all times governed changes in parliamentary procedure at home is never absent from colonial efforts in the same direction. And I venture to think that in this respect the mother country may not dis-

tain to regard the action of its offspring. The freer life and less trammelled conditions of colonial existence conduce to originaive conception and bolder initiative. New light is sometimes cast upon old problems in those younger lands, and clearer views of possible solutions are occasionally obtained and acted upon. They offer also a larger field for experiment. Take, for instance, the question of Federation. Canada, more than thirty years ago, carved out its destiny in that direction just as the United States of America had done so eighty years earlier. Australia has for many years been engaged in the same task, and her many intelligent and able politicians must by this time be equally well equipped as students of international polity and comity with the bulk of statesmen in the old world. In South Africa the same question, after being talked about and nibbled at since 1859, seems likely at last to be handled in a more resolute fashion, nor do I doubt that the early years of the new century will in both continents witness the successful consolidation in each of a Commonwealth or a Confederation.

Nor is novelty of initiative confined to constitutional projects. It invades the domain of social, not less than of political economics. That a larger view of State responsibilities than is taken in older lands should be common in countries but recently occupied was inevitable. Vested interests in the colonies are

neither all-pervading nor venerable. Such as they are they have in most cases been created within the memory of man. Colonial records and muniments have hardly had time to get mouldy. The dust of ages fails to sanctify the deeds and bonds of colonial property holders. Nor, if it did, would it be allowed to obstruct the adoption of any great reform or work of national advancement. Consequently the State, either through government or municipal agency, undertakes duties from which it shrinks elsewhere. In Australia and South Africa the railways are almost entirely in the hands of the governments—are made by them, controlled by them, worked by them. In some cases they are worked at a profit, and bring in a margin of surplus income over and above any charge for interest on the cost of construction. Where they fail to do this it is because the community benefits—perhaps unduly—by low rates of conveyance. In all cases the lines are managed on the principle of conducting solely to the convenience and well-being of the people, or taxpayers, whose property they are. Harbours are also, as a rule, managed by government, though the duties are often devolved upon representative Trusts and Boards. In some countries the policy of State control is carried yet further. Industrial undertakings are established and conducted by government departments, or through subsidised government agencies.

In this category may be placed model and dairy farms, plantations of fruit, timber, tea, coffee, tobacco, mulberry and eucalyptus, central sugar mills, factories for the production and preparation of fibres, pottery, woven fabrics, works for the manufacture of iron, steel, brass, and other metals, of paper, of chemicals, of woodwork. Quarries and mines are opened up and worked ; printing offices are organised and maintained ; foundries and railway work-shops are established or supported. There is, indeed, no line of industrial activity which does not, somewhere or other, engage the attention or secure the aid of government. The government of a free colony has almost of necessity to become a Board of Exploitation, and to direct its energies to the business of industrial development, with a zeal little less in degree than that which it displays in the performance of administrative duty. When the first settlers arrived, the virgin soil of those new countries, untilled and unfruitful, clamoured for the labour of man's hand. It lay blankly beneath the sun waiting for the touch of human toil to make it contributory to man's requirements. The earlier adventurers into such vast and dormant wildernesses felt their resources unequal to their opportunities, and demanded of their rulers assistance in the work of turning those opportunities to account. Under Crown government such appeals might pass unheeded, but when the colonies came to

govern themselves it was impossible to neglect them. The tendency, no doubt, has been often unduly in the other direction. Overmuch compliance with popular demands for State aid has at times contributed to extravagance, debt, and difficulty. But looking at the question all round, it cannot be denied that the expenditure of energy and money by colonial governments in the promotion of industrial enterprise has been well repaid by an enormous expansion of productive power and wealth. Public funds may, in many cases, have been wasted or squandered, but the countervailing results have been abundant. New resources opened out; manufactures established; waste lands reclaimed; mines developed; industries of all sorts fostered and multiplied; population employed, wealth generally increased, prosperity promoted, and the common weal advanced—these are results which may be held to outweigh any particular instances of excess or blunder in carrying out the policy which has produced them. On the ethical merits of that policy I do not pretend to say anything. My object is to consider accomplished facts, not to discuss social laws or doctrines concerning them. That in British self-governed colonies the State has played a most effective and considerable part in their industrial development, and is likely to do so in the future, is a fact that cannot be gainsaid.

EDUCATION AND JUSTICE.

In another branch of colonial activity the State has been not less potential. Education in all of them owes much to government action. On this point combined statistical data are not readily procurable ; but enough is at command to make it apparent that in every colony the school needs of the people are carefully dealt with by the governments. A few years ago I had occasion to examine the systems in force throughout the empire, with more especial reference to the character and extent of State control, and the result was to show a fairly proportioned balance between direct departmental administration and management by representative Boards. In each case success may be said to depend upon the character, or quality, of the materials employed. Earnestness, capacity, and tact on the part of the ministerial department, or zeal, intelligence, and self-restraint on the part of the School Board or Committee, will avail in either case to produce the best results. But these qualities cannot always be ensured. There may be indifference, incompetency, or bad temper in the one case ; or neglect, ignorance, and violence in the other ; with the corresponding certainty of an enfeebled or demoralised school system. Those are results, however, which, all the world over, will spring from the same causes. As a rule, the common sense will

combine with the self interest of communities to rectify whatever evils may arise. The manner in which funds are obtained for educational purposes is as varied as the colonies are numerous. The general tendency is towards free schooling, or to the reduction of school charges to the lowest possible minimum. Where local boards exist, local school rates are usual, and the ratepayers properly form a constituent body. The local contribution is frequently, if not commonly, supplemented by a government grant, and there are cases in which the whole cost is borne by the general revenue. Voluntary schools, however, exist side by side; and, except where compulsory school rates are imposed, they are apt to flourish. They are mostly, however, institutions of a higher class than the primary school, and provide for the needs of more wealthy people. In regard to secondary education, the colonies may justly claim to have shown intelligence and foresight. The universities and colleges that have been established in most of them are monuments to the prescience of their statesmen and the munificence of their citizens. Both have perceived the existence in colonial life of certain conditions which are apt to prove depressing and retrogressive if they be not counteracted by specific remedial influences. Although the tendency prevails—as strongly, I believe, as ever—amongst colonial parents, whose means permit of it, to secure for their children academical

opportunities in the old world, provision is sedulously made for higher culture on the spot. Thanks to the facilities afforded by the home universities, it is possible, by means of local examinations, to participate in the advantages offered by those ancient seats of learning. Such affiliations and extensions cannot be too warmly commended as a most effective form of federative action. In the remoter settlements, it is, of course, difficult to bring even elementary education within the reach of poor and scattered colonists, but it may confidently be said as a whole that her Majesty's colonial subjects of the rising generation may stand without shame in their minds' equipment by the side of their contemporaries in the mother country.

It is a quality of youth to be adventurous, and it is in the natural order of things that in measures of social legislation the colonies should occasionally shoot ahead of the parent land. Where all men occupy more or less the same social plane it is easier to carry out political and economical experiments than it is in communities where the walls and barriers of class and interest are strengthened by age, magnitude and prescription. Of all the colonies the one which has aptly been described as the "Britain of the South" has been most venturesome in this direction. I do not presume to offer any detailed description of the legislative work done in

New Zealand—in itself a fitting and instructive theme for a separate essay. It is enough to mention the measures passed and operating there in connection with Boards of Conciliation, Old Age Pensions, Factory Acts, and Female Suffrage, as instances of bold colonial initiative—colonial temerity some might say—in grappling with problems and propositions that have been discussed but not definitely dealt with in Great Britain itself. In this regard physical law seems reversed. The momentum is greater at the extremity than the centre. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the thought which has birth at home spends itself in action in the distant colony. There, while the incentive to action is more strenuous, the difficulties to be overcome are less severe. Thus it is that the colonies afford object lessons in practical politics which may serve to guide and influence the activities of the old world.

In providing for the administration of justice English colonists have never lost sight of the parental example. The independence of the Bench is by no means to them a mere historical phrase. It is a vital and cherished principle, the sanctity of which is recognised by all parties and classes. The aim of every colonial government has been to make law and order paramount—to bring justice to every person's door. The activity shown in preparing and enacting laws is matched by the care taken to administer them.

There have been occasions when the relations of the judiciary and the civil power have been strained; when ministers or parliaments have sought to encroach upon the independence of magistrates or judges, or when the prerogatives of the latter have been injudiciously pressed. But in the end reason and right have prevailed, and the dignity of judicial procedure has been vindicated without an undue continuance of unseemly conflict. Of magisterial venality or corruption nothing need be said. So far as I am aware it is an unknown quantity throughout the empire. Colonists are proud of their judicial tribunals, and with good reason. The members of them will, in respect of learning, probity, character, and acumen, stand comparison with their contemporaries in any part of the world. The fact that some of the Chief Justices—colonists by birth and training—have been appointed members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, tells its own tale. In selecting impartial justices of the peace, or stipendiary magistrates, the governments are equally mindful of their obligation to maintain a high standard of judicial integrity and conduct. The result is seen in that respect for law, in that prevalence of order, which are characteristic of the whole empire. It may well enkindle pride to reflect that the name of Englishman is synonymous with fairness and justice in the remotest wildernesses and amongst the wildest tribes. Now and then

perhaps, an exception may occur, but its extreme rarity is evidenced by the scandal it creates. People who live at home can hardly realise the work that is being done in distant regions by representatives of this class. Indifferently paid and often poorly-housed or badly-fed, young, and sometimes older, magistrates, are day by day representing the Queen's name and upholding Anglo-Colonial and Anglo-Indian authority, amidst savage or semi-civilised races, by moral influence alone. With a handful of constables to support them—though happily with an empire at their back—they are able to enforce the observance of law, to prevent the spread of crime, and to plant the seeds of civilisation in alien though prolific soil. This work has been going on for the past fifty years, and it is going on still, day by day, the supply of men to do it never failing as the empire extends and the field of labour grows. It is a most hopeful augury that the younger colonists show no less aptitude than their predecessors for the proper discharge of these responsibilities. Though the sphere of duty offers no prizes in the shape of fortunes or high distinction, it attracts an excellent type of man by reason of its social dignity and respectability, and its popularity as a career may be taken as a fair test of the formative influences of colonisation on the character and mind.

DEFENCE.

Maintenance of order is closely akin to means of defence. Much has been said and written on this question, but much more remains to be said. It is greatly to be desired that some steps should be taken to secure in tabulated form a comprehensive statement of the forces that have been organised throughout the empire for defensive purposes. Until that be done it is difficult to proceed with any argument as to present resources and future requirements. It cannot be said with truth that the colonies have been supine or indifferent on the subject: their efforts may have been proportioned to their needs. Where elements of danger have been non-existent, the impulse to organising activity has been correspondingly absent. The case of Australia, for instance, cannot be compared with that of New Zealand; still less with that of Africa. The great island continent has enjoyed an enviable immunity from war or rebellion, or from the serious threatenings of either. Yet there the absence of local peril or menace has in no way deadened the patriotic instinct. Whenever an imperial crisis has impended, Australian loyalty has nobly asserted itself. Canada, like South Africa, has had its own reasons for anxiety and organisation, and both countries can show defensive forces that do credit to local patriotism. In all the colonies local con-

stabularies have been established and trained to a high standard of efficiency. The Volunteer forces of Greater Britain afford not less conspicuous testimony to the patriotic feeling that inspires the community.

Two years ago they took an honourable part on the august occasion of the Queen's Jubilee, and the welcome accorded to them in the streets of the metropolis was a magnificent demonstration of imperial unity.

If we consider the area involved, the interests at stake, the distances to be bridged, and the warlike nature of some of the races to be subjugated, the actual cost of her over-sea empire to the mother country has been small beyond precedent. Nothing like it is recorded in history. Putting aside the wars in India, mostly, I believe, if not wholly, paid for by the Indian exchequer, the total amount paid by the imperial treasury for the defence of colonies during the present century would probably not exceed 30 millions sterling.¹ Let us try to realise what this means. For a sum not much larger than one-fourth of the present annual income of the United Kingdom, fifty-four territories, that comprise 12 million square miles, or one-fourth of the earth's land-surface, have been conquered or acquired, their native occupants pacified and brought under British rule, a volume of

¹ I state this under liability to correction, as precise figures on the question are inaccessible.

trade now estimated at a yearly value of 338 millions developed, and homelands of boundless extent opened out and secured to the Anglo-Saxon race. Considered even from the most sordid and matter-of-fact point of view, this surely has been the wisest and most lucrative investment ever effected in the polity of nations. It may be urged, perhaps, that no account has been taken of the increased cost of imperial armaments, of land and sea forces, entailed by these vast transmarine possessions. Admitting that this phase of the question ought not to be overlooked, it may be asked whether the strength of the army or the navy would have been materially less than it is had England not possessed her colonies? Or, granting that there has been some increment of outlay in that respect, is it not certain that a far greater diminution of national income caused by diminished trade and reduced revenue and a generally lowered scale of national prosperity would have accompanied any such shrinkage of imperial estate? There is also another aspect to be considered. Do not these colonial stations and garrisons secure practical advantages to both the navy and army, as affording opportunities for exercise, experience, and acclimatisation—as training places in fact for both? It is for the expert authorities of both services to say whether or not it is of use and value to have as it were the wide world open for the distribution and the

operation of imperial forces both by land and sea, than to be cooped within the narrow seas that gird the parent islands. I venture to think that certain European powers of aspiring tendencies often envy this country its possession of outposts in distant oceans, where its soldiers and sailors can peacefully pursue their vocations under the ægis of their own flag.¹

¹ When presiding at the reading of my paper on "The Progress of the Colonies" before the Society of Arts, on May 19, 1869, the late Sir George Grey used these words:—The question with regard to the expense of keeping troops in the colonies had been very much overrated in England. In point of fact, British troops in the colonies cost Great Britain much less than they would if they were all assembled in England. Provisions were cheaper in the colonies, clothing was cheaper, and barracks were now ready, or nearly ready, and in a thousand ways the colonies helped to relieve Great Britain of a large portion of the military expenditure of the nation. Another important question was this, that the British troops, employed, as they were, in various parts of the world, were trained in every kind of discipline, and prepared for every duty they might have to undertake. British regiments might have been seen in South Africa, for instance, marched off to the most distant portions of our African settlements, perhaps a thousand miles from Cape Town, taking a measured pace, the same number of inches to the step, and steps to the minute, undergoing the severest training, and all this tending ultimately to support British rule in India, at a moment when it appeared to be on the point of annihilation. That man would be a bold one who would say that it was not this training which enabled them to discharge their duties in a manner which they could not have done if they had been simply trained in garrison towns at home. Our troops were distributed throughout the world in such a manner as to enable a force to be at once collected at any

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Another condition which pre-eminently distinguishes the colonial empire from that of any other power past or present, and marks out the colonial policy of Great Britain during the nineteenth century from that of any other epoch, is that the colonies have ceased to be a financial burden to the mother country as they have increased in age and stature. Self-government in their case—where conditions are normal—has meant self-defence. Where colonial governments have undertaken the responsibilities of administration, they have also accepted and cheerfully borne the responsibilities of defence. When war has been the result of colonial policy or action, its cost has been borne by the colony. Only where and when imperial control has been exercised has the imperial exchequer been mulct in expenses. And even in one case, where no political responsibility was assumed by the colonial authorities, the local treasury contributed its quota to the cost of operations. Circumstances may arise, of course, as in South Africa, where it is necessary to maintain an imperial garrison, for

threatened point. Then there was this further point to be considered. Would any one say, if the whole British army was withdrawn from the colonies into Great Britain, that we should submit patiently and quietly to such an unconstitutional proceeding as to find some hundred thousand troops permanently quartered in the country? He believed a cry would be raised that the army should be reduced, and if it were reduced, it would be difficult to create it again when the necessity arose."

imperial as well as colonial purposes; and it is characteristic of the nation that there is no hesitation in recognising the obligation; but as a whole the glad fulfilment by the colonies of their duty to defend themselves from all internal elements of danger is beyond denial or dispute.

In one respect it is just possible that the colonies may lead the way towards a policy which is already being faintly foreshadowed by hint and allusion. What future may be in store for the gospel of universal peace and international disarmament is not to be considered here. Actual tendencies will have, however, to be much more hopeful than they are in that direction before mankind feels absolved from the duty of providing for possibilities. The system of popular enrolment, repugnant though it has been, and probably is still, to Anglo-Saxon usages and instincts, may still be found a necessary condition of national existence. It may be found preferable in the end to the maintenance of a vast standing army of paid legionaries. The popularity and success of any such system would depend upon the rules under which it might be carried out. A policy under which the entire young manhood of a nation is led to regard service to the State as an elementary personal duty is quite compatible with the much prized liberty of the subject. There are worse things for a free community than the subjection of its young men to the

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disciplinary obligations of military service. Nothing is better calculated to make men out of boys—to inculcate habits of order, obedience, self-control—to develop manly instincts and patriotic purpose—than judiciously applied drill and organisation. I speak with some little practical knowledge of the subject, having taken part in the establishment of cadet corps in connection with all the chief public schools of the colony I have most to do with. These bodies are voluntary, in so far as that no penalty attaches to non-membership of them on the part of any scholar. But no penalty is needed, as all are eager to join, all deem it a privilege to serve, and all regard their work as cadets as the most enjoyable part of their school duties. It is conceivable that by means of an extension and consolidation of this system—and why not at home as well as in the colonies?—the practical effects of a military training might be obtained without actual recourse to what many regard as the terrors of the conscription. That the morale and physique of the boys thus trained and exercised are sensibly and materially improved, experience has abundantly demonstrated. That their capacity as fighting material must thereby be developed is self-evident. That their mental equipment does not suffer by the improvement of their physical powers is proved by the admissions and enthusiasm of their teachers.

COLONISATION AND PROGRESS.

The principle of self-government in the colonies extends through all the ramifications of life. There is not a phase of institutional effort that does not exemplify self-rule. Municipal activity is not less vigorous and popular than political work. In the wildest and most secluded districts it is not long before some sort of representative action is established. The magistrate will consult with the older settlers, informally at first, and then will co-operate with them in more organised fashion. Local committees are formed, to be followed by road boards and village guardians, until with the imposition of rates and taxes comes the full-fledged organisation of district or divisional councils and borough corporations with all their attendant machinery. Nor do these representative bodies, in those young and democratic communities, disdain the outward symbols of civic authority that are customary in more ancient lands. Robes, chains of office and maces, are constantly being adopted as official accessories by colonial municipalities whose existence dates back only a decade or two. It must be admitted, however, that in other respects the progress of colonial cities keeps pace with that of the older world. The rapidity with which those towns develop is one of the marvels of the age.

Where fifty years ago wastes of sand or bush stretched tenantless, now stand populous and thriving cities—with metalled streets and roads, paved footways, tramways, cabs, omnibuses, rickshas, a splendid electric light service, an abounding water supply, miles of many storeyed buildings, spacious and handsome parks, squares, and gardens, public fountains, statues and monuments, an efficient police system and stately town halls that vie in grandeur with those of the largest provincial cities in Europe. That fast disappearing personage, an "original settler," finds it hard, indeed, to recall amidst these evidences of latter-day civilisation the scenes that first met his eye—the dreams of those early days having been so marvelously eclipsed by the realisations of the present time. It is needless to add that taxation has grown with development, and that all these appurtenances of civilisation mean corresponding expenditure and cost. Yet the communities affected do not appear to resent the burdens thus entailed—more, that is, than rate-payers do everywhere. Apart from the actual benefits derived, they feel a personal pride in the results that have been attained. "Progress" is, in truth, the keynote of Anglo-Saxon colonisation. It is the word most commonly on the lips of the colonial politician and representative. It expresses the passion of his existence—his heart's desire as a citizen. That the sentiment often leads him on beyond the bounds of

prudence, he is ready to admit in chastened moments ; but the impulse remains, and the pace continues. What the end will be this century cannot witness. That it should be of necessity disastrous by no means follows. Advancement is not confined to the towns only. Urban expansion is but a reflex of rural development. If the humble townships have been transformed, the face of the whole country has been changed. Where the eye fifty or sixty years ago, or less, saw nothing but illimitable expanses of trackless plain—lifeless slope, or rank and rotting vegetation—it now ranges over fields, fences, plantations, groves, factories, and homesteads, all of which bespeak the productive energy of industrious men. Where nature then reigned absolute and desolate, labour now proclaims its presence and its conquests at every turn. Where man was then conspicuous by his absence, and life was only visible in its wildest and destructive forms, the landscape now teems with marks of human energy, and the erstwhile wilderness abounds everywhere with the fruits of human toil.

COLONIAL MANUFACTURES.

There are no available figures which serve to indicate the aggregate outgrowth of production in specific directions. It must suffice to state generally, that while the growth of products and live stock is still

the mainstay of colonial industry, the tendency to develop local manufactures steadily advances. Thirty years ago I said that "the colonies will for long years yet have enough to do in supplying the old world with raw materials. That is their obvious function. They have the virgin soil, the boundless pasture lands, the unpeopled acres which are required for the purposes of extended production. That the colonies are making progress in the arts of manufacture is undoubted, but it is not in a manner or to an extent likely to affect their commercial relations with this country." During the interval that has elapsed, the progress of colonial manufactures has been so rapid as to compel some modification of this view. We did not in those days take sufficient account of inherited habits and race instincts, nor did we realise how rapid might be the evolution of industrial activities under conditions favourable for their growth. It was inevitable that people sprung from and belonging to a manufacturing race would carry with them wherever they might plant themselves, the qualities of contrivance, ingenuity and productiveness that had made Britain the workshop of the world. It was improbable that communities thus endowed would long be content to consume the products of distant manufactures beyond the sea, or that, having at hand and around them a lavish supply of raw materials, they would fail in the course of time to convert those

staples into commodities of daily use. The pressure of fiscal charges has also operated in the same direction. In every colony, except mere ports of call like Singapore or Hong Kong, customs duties are a necessary source of revenue. Direct taxation in a sparse, a young and struggling community cannot be expected to yield sufficient for the revenue requirements of government. A customs tariff, therefore, being an unavoidable necessity of existence, the disposition to use it for the protection of industry, as well as for the purposes of administration, has had constant encouragement. Customs duties have advanced with time. Their average charge on imports ranges from five to thirty per cent. Even in Natal, where the principle of a low tariff was for many years piously adhered to with satisfactory results, the policy of protection in a modified form has been adopted—though ostensibly for political purposes—and there is no apparent prospect that the custom house will cease to be in the future one of the mainstays of colonial revenue. Under these circumstances local manufactures have been certain to expand. They start with a fixed percentage of protective duty in their favour, and against that solid advantage the increased cost of labour, better facilities of production, and lowered freights, fail to contend. It need not, however, be feared that for a long time to come the colonial

market will be closed to the home manufacturer. The twentieth century will be far advanced before the progress of manufacturing industry in the colonies effects any material change in the trade returns of Great Britain. But it is a fact to be remembered and reckoned with as this century closes, that the wealth of the colonies is represented by the craft of man, as well as by the produce of the soil, and that more and more British colonists are relying upon their own efforts for the supply of their own needs.

COLONISTS AS PIONEERS.

Before we close this rapid survey of colonial expansion during the century, let us glance at the people to whom that expansion is due. It is but right to do so, as their lives and their labours belong essentially to the century. They were born in it, and most of them have died in it, and the century is their proper monument. Much is said and written nowadays about empire-builders, as though the empire was the creation of this or that man's individual daring, energy or genius—as though the colonies owed their existence and their development to a species of constructive Cæsarism on the part of a few gifted or specially courageous men. Far be it from me to withhold from any name whatever credit may be justly due to farseeing statesmanship, ambitious

purpose or patriotic design. My desire is not to deny rightful recognition to individuals, but to extend it to all. Remember that the colonial empire was mainly in existence prior to the last thirty years, that the British flag was planted on the four continents and the many islands during the three first quarters of the century. It was then that the empire was chiefly founded, and that its limits were first laid down. And it was by the outgoers and the emigrants of those days that the foundations of the mighty fabric were laid. They were the true empire-builders of the Anglo-Saxon race. It is to their pluck and their readiness to face privation, to their fearless quest of fortune in new and distant lands, to their toils and struggles and hand-to-hand combat with hard nature and hostile barbarism that the Briton of to-day owes the empire that is his. That empire is essentially the offspring of voluntary effort. It cannot be said to owe its existence to schemes of ambition or deeds of conquest. Its pioneers went forth neither to the roll of the drum nor the blast of the trumpet, nor were they inspired by the lofty purpose of the first American settlers, or the latter Huguenot refugees of South Africa. Theirs was not the quest of a "faith's pure shrine," nor did they seek only "freedom to worship God," for they had both at home. Theirs was the prosaic, perhaps, but not less effective impulse of social betterment. They went abroad to find new homes, wider breathing

space, cheaper land, larger opportunities of activity, easier openings, brighter prospects, or, possibly, improved health. Many of them sought to retrieve shattered fortunes, to give their children better chances, to improve their own social standing, to pursue their callings under more favoured circumstances. Few of them realised beforehand the experiences that awaited them on the distant shore, or knew the troubles that lay ahead. And well was it so, as their hearts would have fainted if not failed before the grim reality. In these days of giant steamers and spreading railways and settled government it is difficult to recall the experiences of the early colonists. Their sufferings at sea were but a fitting prelude to the privations on land. The illusions that beguiled their path began to vanish as soon as they lost sight of England. They had not only to begin life anew, but to begin it under strange and repulsive conditions. Disappointment was usually their lot. Few succeeded in the first object they had in view. Failure had again and again to be encountered, and the struggle to be renewed with unabated energy. They had all to unlearn, and everything to learn; and the knowledge which now enriches and guides their successors was purchased by the sweat of their brows, and the foiled efforts of their hands. Nor was it only the men who bore this part in the work of colonisation. Their stubborn energy and sturdy conflicts

with difficulty were nobly matched by the patient endurance and brave self-sacrifice of the women who accompanied them—the wives and sisters and daughters, who in their humble fields of household heroism, helped, by personal toil and the abandonment of most that woman's heart holds dear, to build up on the basis of domestic relationship the empire of their country and their Queen.

If England's colonies have added strength and stability to England's empire it has been largely due to the character of the people who created and constituted them. They left their native shore as colonists and homeseekers, to identify their lives and labours with the lands of their adoption—to establish homes, rear families, develop interests, acquire citizenship—to transplant themselves root as well as branch in the new soil, there to live and multiply, to thrive or fail, reproducing in these fresh scenes the virtues or the faults of the parent race, and transmitting to the generations beyond them the household traditions and family loving instincts of the Anglo-Saxon stock. It is by these men and these women that the empire has been built, and it will be by their descendants and successors that the empire will be upheld or transformed.

COLONISTS AND NATIVE RACES.

The success that has attended on the whole British rule of savage races is attributable, no doubt, to the character of the people brought in contact with those tribes. Experience may vary on this point with locality and circumstance, but it cannot be denied that wherever the aboriginal inhabitants of the colonies have been susceptible of civilisation and improvement they have been fairly dealt with by their white neighbours. In cases where domestication or absorption has been rendered impossible by the ineradicable ferocity or nomadism of the race, a process of gradual disappearance has been inevitable. Neither in North America nor in Australia has it been possible to save the indigenous occupants of the soil from slow decline and ultimate extinction. Sad though the result may be from a sentimental point of view, it has to be regarded as the outworking of natural law. It is, at any rate, consolatory to know that the process has not been hastened by deliberate cruelty or wrongdoing on the part of the representatives of civilisation. Fifty years ago it was the fashion to say and to think otherwise ; and even in later days the stigmas that were cast upon the colonist as an oppressor and despoiler of the black man have not lacked repetition. They have ceased to be in vogue,

however, and it would be waste of time to refute them. Africa is likely for ages yet to afford an object lesson to the student of inter-racial relations. There, at any rate, the native is not dying out, nor has civilisation been the destruction of the black man. It may be too early yet to base confident forecasts upon present observations, but there is no immediate evidence that the African native is to disappear as European colonisation advances. So far his tendency is to multiply under the benign influences of peace and order. This variance from the experience of aboriginal races in North America and Australasia is probably due to the readiness of the African black man to work for wages. The work may be desultory and fitful, it may be broken by frequent intervals of idleness or rest ; but that it is rendered in a growing degree cannot be denied. On farms and plantations, in stores and households, in mines and public works, as shepherds and as waggon drivers, thousands and tens of thousands of African natives are now engaged as wage earners under European employers. This disposition at once differentiates the native of the Dark Continent from his intractable congener elsewhere, and opens out to him and his race a prospect of continued vitality and reclamation. And it does something more. It is a practical refutation of the calumny that the white colonist is the natural oppressor of the black man.

His labour, be it noted, in all its forms, is voluntary—not forced. It is not compulsory, except in certain cases, where, labour being urgently needed for public requirements, recourse is had to the prescriptive right of chiefs to exact contributions from their people for tribal purposes. Were the colonists the cruel task-masters and spoliators they are sometimes made out to be, this readiness to work for wages—and for increasing wage rates—would assuredly not exist.

So far as the Dark Continent is concerned it is a fact of happy augury that colonisation and British rule go hand in hand. No other race has succeeded more completely than has the Anglo-Saxon in the administrative control and economic development of new countries, or in the industrial pacification of savage races. There may at times have been blunders in the treatment of what are called “native questions,” scandals may occasionally have given rise to controversy and to railing—the vials of philanthropic wrath are ever ready to bubble over—but, regarded as a whole, the management of subject aboriginal races by both the imperial and colonial governments has been just, humane, and merciful. That is a conclusion based upon fifty years of close association with the native affairs of South Africa. And it is upon her experience in the past as a coloniser that Great Britain can take her stand should the course of events

necessitate some further expansion of dominion in the regions occupied by barbarism.

The claim of our country to be a great colonising power rests also on a further foundation. British colonies have been governed for their own benefit, not for the enrichment of the imperial exchequer, or the mere aggrandisement of imperial statesmen. Though their administration may not cost the mother country anything, their existence does not directly replenish by one penny the home treasury. Self-government in them means government by the colonists and for the colonists in the fullest sense. If it be impossible for any member of the British Parliament to rise in his seat to-day and denounce the colonial empire as a ruinous and intolerable drain upon the national purse, it is not less impossible for any colonial legislator to taunt the mother country with a desire to batten upon the profits or the earnings of colonial taxpayers. In this absence of specific or selfish advantage on either side—in this even balance of mutual interests and obligations—may be found the best and strongest guarantee of enduring sway.

THE OUTLOOK.

I must now close this retrospect of the past, this view of the present, with a glance at the future. Conditions change so swiftly in these days—unforeseen circumstances so often divert the course of events—

that any forecast of colonial probabilities is alike hazardous and difficult. Fortunately for our national pride, the prospect is brighter than it used to be. When the century was a generation younger, British colonisation was almost a byword. He would have been regarded as a mad dreamer of dreams who might then have talked about colonial expansion, or widening dominion. To-day expansion is a fact, and dominion steadily extends. But, far more than that, colonial loyalty deepens and broadens, and the solidarity of the empire yearly improves. The tendency of modern policy both at home and abroad is to strengthen and tighten the cords that bind Great Britain to her offspring, and to foster and heighten the sentiment of colonial self-respect.¹

¹ On this point may I again quote from the paper read thirty years ago :—" But I may speak of the moral gain secured to the people of this country by the existence of lesser Englands, where boundless opportunities of advancement are presented to every class of migrating people. Here, in this old and thickly-crowded land, it may be that men find it hard to stem the torrent of competition, or to rise to higher levels of social life or public usefulness. But there, in those fifty dependencies, openings abound for every kind of effort, and every grade of ambition. There, the farmer can acquire by slight outlay, and by indisputable title, breadths of soil that in Europe would almost make a small principality. There, the honest working man can live on his own freehold, and work his way on by rapid steps to a condition of honourable independence. There, the earnest youth who looks to public life as the proper field of patriotic aims, can find the object of his aspirations within ready reach. There, the distinctions may be less dazzling, the sphere of public recogni-

For be it marked that the word "loyalty" when used by a colonist has a twofold application. This is a view of the question that cannot be too carefully considered. It is a natural outcome of advancing age. Fifty years ago it was unnoticed, because the conditions that have led up to it did not exist. There were then few native-born colonists. The settlers had mostly come from the British Islands; their childhood had been passed on British soil and amidst British surroundings. "Home" meant literally to them the land they had left, rather than the land they lived in.

Now all this is past. The colonial veterans of to-day such as remain, were the children or the young folks, who migrated with their parents about or soon after the middle of the century. The middle-aged

tion may be obscurer and less prominent, but the chances of attaining them are incomparably more abundant, and the influence exerted, when viewed in its bearing on the future that is now being shaped and foreshadowed, is, if anything, more direct and more enduring."

"Surely, to a race impelled, as ours is, by its own natural instincts to go abroad, it is no slight privilege and advantage to have, in all zones, and by all seas, lands for its sons and daughters to occupy, where English institutions are established, where the English tongue is spoken, where the habits and customs of our race are reproduced, where the English principles of self-government can be gradually applied and perhaps gradually extended; and where, under the English flag, freedom can be enjoyed without licence, and religion in its purest forms can be fostered, shielded and upheld."

colonists were the babes who accompanied those parents, or who were born shortly after their advent in the colony. The younger colonists, those who are now in the ripe fulness of life's strength—and men mature rapidly in young communities—have been born on the new soil—the air they breathe is that of the new world—their whole lives have been spent amidst Canadian, or Australasian, or South African surroundings. To them, "old England" represents a thought rather than a concrete fact. "Home" in their eyes is the place of their birth, the scene of their abode, the area of their life's work and family associations. It is the land that was first occupied by their fathers, the residence that has always been identified with their mothers, the locality that has witnessed all their efforts and their labours. In some cases its soil has been purchased by the blood of their kindred or by their own efforts in the field. In all cases it has been won from the wilderness by the strength of their arms and the sweat of their brow. They have seen it become populous and productive under their eyes. They have grown with its growth, and kept step with its advancement. Theirs is not only the joy of possession, but the pride of creation; not merely the obligations of inheritance, but the consciousness of acquisition, bind them to their colonial home. What wonder is it, therefore, that to the young colonial-born citizen the claims of the new

land are paramount in his affections? It would be strange and discreditable were it otherwise. What is patriotism but the love of one's native land? And what is one's native land, according to every dictionary and definition, but the country one is born in? It is necessary to lay stress on this point inasmuch as it underlies the whole future of our imperial relationship, and as the recognition of it must influence the direction of future thought and policy. Only now is the fact being adequately realised. On the part of the older colonists there has been a natural repugnance to an apparent removal—I will not say alienation—of what may be called the centre of patriotic gravity. To those of us who were born in the mother country—and who still regard this country as “home”—there is something of pain in the evolution of another sentiment on the part of our children. It jars upon one's sensibilities to hear the word “English” used as though it were something apart or foreign. Though *we* may have said with pride, “We are Englishmen first and colonists afterwards,” it would be unnatural, if not improper, to expect our children to say or to think so. They are but following in our wake. They are but reproducing our own instincts. They are but pursuing the order of things that has existed from the beginning of mankind. Their love of the land they tread is the best hope of the empire to

which that land belongs. It has in all ages been the mainstay of patriotism :—

“Breathes there a man with soul so dead
Who never to himself has said,
This is my own—my native land !”

That is exactly the sentiment of the colonial-born traveller as he turns his footsteps homeward from ancient lands. It is a sentiment completely reconcilable with his loyalty to the empire and to his Queen.

“That man’s the best cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best.”

Nor will that man be the less loyal subject of Great Britain because his first affections as a citizen belong to the land that gave him birth. In his case the lesser interest in no sense weakens the larger tie, The chain is strengthened by the tenacity of its links. National pride is compatible with imperial supremacy. A Canadian, or an Australian, or a South African need not be the less ardent British subject because he is devoted to his own land, any more than the Highlander is less a Scotchman, or the Scotsman is less a Briton, or the Yorkshireman is less an Englishman, because he clings passionately to the locality whose name he bears.

That this outgrowth of distinctive national feeling will quicken with years and deepen with the lapse of

generations is inevitable. How to harmonise and associate it with the spread of imperial unity is one of the problems to be solved during the coming century. In considering it, we have no effective precedents to guide us, for the world has never witnessed the outgrowth of such a fabric as is the British empire. Analogies may be found in history, but they fail in exactitude of correspondence. We have to deal with a body of facts as they exist now not with detached instances of political similarities in the past. It may be said briefly, but absolutely, in the first place, that success in working out the problem will primarily depend upon independence of action on the part of the several factors. Any attempt at dictation on the part of the central power would as surely end in failure, as would any attempt at dictation on the part of one colony towards a weaker neighbour. When England gives self-government to any of her colonies, she gives it absolutely and irrevocably; and the scrupulous observance of that principle has been the sheet-anchor of colonial loyalty amidst the stress and strain of internal troubles. Depart from that salutary, that splendid rule, and the empire's integrity will perish; cherish it, and nothing short of insanity on the part of statesmen will precipitate disruption.

Imperial unity—I speak of it as existing already—will also be fostered by the gradual development of a larger spirit, and fuller sense of citizenship on both

sides of the ocean. In both the mother country and the colony the true proportions of British citizenship have yet to be properly realised. People are apt to be limited in their conceptions by their own horizons, and the barriers of space and sea tend to circumscribe the vision. Improved facilities of intercourse and conveyance will rapidly modify this condition. Much has been done already by railway extension, steamship development and telegraphic communication, to bring the homefolk and the colonists together. Frequency and closeness of association break down the barriers of strangeness and ignorance. The railway has already proved itself to be the most potential of unifiers. It has been so conspicuously in North America. It is proving itself to be so in Australia and South Africa. And what the railway does on land for the colonies, lines of larger and swifter steamships will do on the sea for the empire. The establishment of the penny post is a true triumph wherewith to crown the century—May a sixpenny cable rate soon follow it—May quicker voyages and cheapened passenger fares multiply the numbers of those who go to and fro across the dividing oceans—Every other form of mutual co-operation conduces to the growth of unity. Year by year the position and the office of Agent-General advance in utility and importance. These official representatives of the colonies take a more and more active part in the

public affairs and social life of the mother country. Two great Conferences have brought the statesmen of the colonies into direct personal contact with the Ministers of the empire. Members of both Houses of Parliament frequently represent the Crown in its most important dominions, or by personal visits secure for themselves that practical knowledge of colonial affairs which direct observation most surely imparts. Colonial leaders and legislators continually expand and equip their minds by travel in the ancient abodes of civilisation. Judicial solidarity is being promoted by the addition of colonial Judges and Ministers to the Privy Council and of colonists "learned in the law" to the ranks of Queen's Counsel. The professions of law, medicine and engineering in the colonies are largely recruited by practitioners who have been trained and qualified in home schools and universities. Let us hope that nothing will be done on either side of the ocean to restrict the interchange of professional privileges. By throwing open commissions in the Army and Navy to colonial competitors, and by associating colonial Volunteer corps with the regular forces of the empire, a process of defensive consolidation is gradually going on. Naval contributions by particular colonies also tend in that direction. Canada, the oldest self-governing colony, has generously revealed by the concession of preferential duties the

capabilities of colonial patriotism in the matter of fiscal sacrifice or concession. Natal, the youngest, has testified to the reality of colonial loyalty by the free coaling of her Majesty's war ships. The Cape Colony by its gift of a warship has demonstrated its fealty to the Empire. Reference has already been made to the reciprocation of academic facilities and distinctions, and the extension of university tests and degrees to the colonies. In the sphere of Church work the double process of lengthening the cords—of distant activity—and of strengthening the stakes—of central unity—is being steadfastly pursued. Synods, Conferences, and Unions at home are co-ordinate with similar organisations abroad, all working in concert towards a common end, and in a common system. Commercial co-operation proceeds on like lines, the oversea Chambers acting in harmony with that at home ; and so in all other branches of combined effort and association—mercantile, philanthropic, or scientific, the prevailing tendency of the day is towards federative action, which binds closer and closer together, and keeps in constant touch and harmony, the old life and the new life of the Anglo-Saxon world in both hemispheres.

Nor must mention be omitted of the important part which has been and is being played in the process of imperial unification by the Royal Colonial Institute. Thirty years ago this institution was an infantile and

struggling body, holding its monthly meetings in a room lent by the Institute of Civil Engineers. Thanks to the unflagging enthusiasm and indomitable energy of its founders, maintained through years of indifference and difficulty, this institution has steadily advanced in numbers, strength, influence, and public estimation, until, with its 4,000 members at home and in the colonies, it has now attained a position of unassailable stability and permanence, and fulfils a most potential function as a link of union between the mother country and her colonies. Most deeply is it to be regretted that a kindred institution has not so far realised the splendid purposes for which it was established. Let us hope that in the near future the experiences of the Imperial Institute will more adequately represent its exalted auspices, its noble aims and its great resources.

Of the many potent voices which have in recent years preached the gospel of colonial expansion and imperial responsibility, there is one whose vibrant notes have thrilled with a new emotion the Anglo-Saxon heart. I am thankful as a colonist to know that the genius which has done so much to enkindle the patriotism of our race during the closing years of the century has been spared, let us hope, to continue Rudyard Kipling's work through many coming years.

By such means it is that, whether we desire it or not, the process of imperial federation is gradually, almost

imperceptibly, but yet steadily, making headway. It is not within my purpose to enter upon the discussion of that question here. Nor, in view of the very able essays that have been written thereon is it necessary or desirable to do more than touch upon the well-worn theme. It is enough to know that the proposition is in the air, though as an abstract idea, rather than as a concrete policy. The evolution of that idea has marked the closing years of the nineteenth century; the working out and the fulfilment of it will belong to the century which begins next year. The idea not only exists, but it grows. Its own momentum and its own vitality will secure its expansion. Thirty years ago I dared but refer with bated breath, and literally with humbleness, to the possibility of confederation. It was seemly then to express a hope "that it will be the policy of this great nation to preserve and consolidate not to cast off and disown." No one at that time scouted, as would be scouted to-day, any aspiration to the contrary. No one now ventures to hint at the dismemberment or disintegration of the empire. No one—of whatever school or party—would regard as aught but a calamity the estrangement or forfeiture of any colony. Such movement as there may have been in public opinion is towards unity, not away from it. And, more than that, the change of thought has taken a turn and acquired a dimension which altogether transcend any previous anticipation. The

phrase "Anglo-Saxon" no longer defines the conception of unity ; it has expanded to "Anglo-American" limits, and it embraces within its compass the whole English-speaking race, and, be it added, all the other races that own the rule of English-speaking men. The prospect thus disclosed, in a way so sudden and surprising, is too bewildering in its vastness to be yet properly comprehended. It needs time for contemplation, for the definite embodiment of conditions, and the effective realisation of the difficulties which bar the way. We have yet to learn whether or not this vision of unity is more than a fascinating dream. The variances and distinctions that already mark one section of the race from others may prove insuperable barriers to any concrete form of cohesion. Local circumstances in one area may be so much in conflict with local circumstances in other areas that practical amalgamation may be impossible. Clash or rivalry of individual interests may interpose an impassable bar to union. Wrong, however, though it would be to ignore these possibilities of failure, they need not discourage effort or impoverish hope. The end in view is so desirable and beneficent that every stimulating motive bids us strive for its attainment. Such an alliance as is now talked of would secure the peace of the world and the eventual freedom of mankind. Its prospects of success will depend—will absolutely

depend—upon the spirit which animates its promoters. If the federation of the English-speaking race be promoted for mere purposes of racial supremacy or national aggrandisement, for selfish and sordid ends, and not for the general betterment of humanity, it will sooner or later come to naught. If the lust of power and dominancy, the greed of trade or territory, be its inspiring aims, the policy will be foredoomed to failure. It will collapse from sheer inordinacy. Only in so far as the spread of empire or influence by any one race is attended with benefit and blessing to mankind at large can it hope to become an abiding factor in the world's history.

It is because the colonies of Great Britain have throughout this century been unquestionably contributory to the advancement of civilisation and the progress of the world, that we dare to-day look into the next century and anticipate for them—those of the past as well as those of the present—a future of expansion and consolidation that transcends all past experience. Whenever they cease to fulfil that mission—God grant that they may never do so!—the decadence of the empire will have begun. We have reason not only to pray that—

“Our greatness may not fail
Through craven fears of being great”—

but that it may not fail through unworthiness of aim and effort on the part of those who are responsible for

the guidance of British destinies as statesmen or as citizens. The process of painting the map red may be inspiring and patriotic, but if it be performed for the mere sake of getting bigger or richer than our neighbours it will not win for our race the applause or affection of posterity. The world's waste spaces are still so vast that there is room enough and to spare for the work and activity of other races than our own in the great field of colonisation. That they may make proper use of their opportunity should be the aspiration of every true colonist. England has shown them the way ; let it be their business, if they can, to follow in it. And let it be our business as citizens of the world, not less than as citizens of our common empire, to lend what friendly aid or co-operation we can to other races in their endeavours to reclaim, to civilise and to emancipate the dark places and peoples of the yet unawakened earth.

THE COLONIES AND THE XXTH CENTURY.

We have glanced at the colonies as they were when the century dawned. We have seen what they are now at the century's end. We may fitly close by a glimpse at their future in the century that is to come. Rash as it now is to prophesy, it may confidently be predicted that the colonies and the empire will bulk more and more largely on the national vision as time

goes on. Their destiny forms, in fact, the most engrossing of the political problems of the time. Is imperial unity or federation to be, or not to be? Is it to be a fact or a phrase? Difficult though it may be to answer that question—impossible though it is to argue it within present limits—there is no presumption in saying that the response must be affirmative unless the British empire is to fall to pieces.

Unless the tie which binds the empire together now is drawn closer, it must in the nature of things relax and weaken. We are at the parting of the ways, and the course of events must tend towards either closer union or ultimate disruption.

In all life absolute repose is unknown. Nothing continues to stand still. Movement is a law of vitality. Just as men strengthen as youth advances or fail with lengthening age, so do nations wax or wane. The period of decline is the only point of uncertainty. Some men ripen early and perish ere their prime. Others mature slowly and gain in strength and dignity as they advance in years. Nations and empires also vary in the order of their growth and their declension. Some carry on their glory through many centuries. Others, after a swift development, suffer a rapid collapse. In both cases the duration of existence depends largely upon the conditions that have governed life. A healthy mind in a sound body conduces to length of years. Large-

ness of aim, unselfishness of purpose, liberality of institutions, purity and breadth of character, steadfastness in the pursuit of a patriotic policy, will all tend to the stability and maintenance of national power and empire. If the project—and it is a very noble one—of Anglo-Saxon federation be fostered in this spirit and pursued on these lines, it ought to prosper because it will deserve to succeed.

The details of that project are yet confessedly in the air. Only the principle itself can be said to have yet taken form and had due recognition. There are different methods of working it out. The first great step towards the goal was taken when the Dominion of Canada was compacted twenty-two years ago. Before the empire can be federated its component groups must each be welded together. The noble example set in the North by the eldest group of British colonies has yet to be repeated elsewhere. But the process is going on in the Southern world, slowly perhaps, but all the more surely for the time and the care that is being taken in overcoming the initial difficulties that result from international differences and jealousies. That Australasia will be federalised before the century has emerged from its infancy cannot reasonably be doubted. In South Africa the movement has already, so far as fiscal union is concerned, become an accomplished fact. There, too, the discords and troubles of recent years, and the

difficulties arising from a complex racial texture, will ere long be removed and effaced by the establishment of a common interest under the central rule of a united Government and Parliament. The creation of these consolidated political fabrics in North America, in Australasia and South Africa, will enormously simplify the task of statesmen in combining them all within the encircling shelter of a representative imperial system. The confused and often conflicting voices of many separate colonies will then be confined to the stronger and deeper utterances of a few united provinces. Strictly imperial interests and questions can then be dealt with intelligibly and effectively, and with a clear conception of claims that have to be reconciled and ends that have to be attained.

What may have to be done as regards those colonies that are not, and that cannot in the nature of things be, self-governing remains to be considered. Many of them are islands or islets of the sea, not easily grouped within any federative system. Most, if not all, of them are tropical or equatorial territories, in which it is the lot of Englishmen to rule and to administer, but not to people and to multiply. What may be the ultimate destiny of these magnificent regions is a question as yet unanswerable by man. It may be that the progress of science and sanitation will so modify their climatal conditions as to render them safely habitable by people of European birth.

Experience has already shown what marvellous results in combating malaria and disease can be attained by intelligence and energy. Englishmen fresh from the old world now find it possible to live and multiply in localities which years ago were regarded as pestiferous and deadly. Colonists of the second generation are growing up far in the wilds, yet strong and healthy, in spite of scorching suns and changing temperatures. On this point of racial administration no dogmatic rule can yet be laid down. But one thing is certain as regards the lands of the tropics. In Asia and in Africa, at any rate, they abound with indigenous men; and it falls within the peculiar genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to rule these men wisely and well. If time should demonstrate the impossibility of European colonisation upon any large scale in the tropical districts of either of these two continents, it will only more completely demonstrate the capacity of the British colonist to govern for their own, and for the world's benefit, the native inhabitants that already occupy them. While as regards Africa there is the inevitable certainty that Asia will pour out of her vast human reservoirs an ever-swelling volume of life to develop under British control and auspices the latent resources of the equatorial continent. And what the Anglo-Saxon is doing in certain portions of Africa other nations will, let us hope, do in the territories under their control.

It is no part of my purpose to review what other countries have done or are doing in the planting of colonies, but it would be wrong to ignore their efforts. As a matter of fact English colonies are themselves the scenes of considerable activity on the part of European nationalities. Thanks to that policy of the "open door" which has been in the past, and will ever, I hope, continue to be, one of the glories of our system, there is a free field open to every civilised race in all the colonies. Not only are the representatives of German commerce to be found everywhere, making the best possible use of the opportunities so unreservedly secured to them, but German, Scandinavian, French, and Italian settlers are to be found settled on the soil or engaged in industrial occupations. The social web of population in the colonies promises to be not less complex in its materials than is that of the mother country. We do not, perhaps, take sufficient account of what our neighbours are doing by way of colonial expansion; but France, Germany, and Holland are all playing an important part in tropical Africa and elsewhere, under their own flags, and in some respects their methods and processes might advantageously be studied, as examples—to be followed or avoided, as the case may be. But in any case we ought gladly to welcome them as competitors—or rather as coadjutors—in the business of spreading civilisation. There is room enough and

to spare for us all in that sphere of effort. Much can be done by neighbourly example and co-operation to assist those nations in the great task which lies before them—the task of pacifying and civilising and exploiting regions that lie now in darkness and in bondage—the task in whose fulfilment by able and liberal hands the world, with ourselves, has a common concern.

IMPERIAL UNITY AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

When once the process of local or provincial confederation has been completed in Australia and in Africa, the larger and grander project of imperial union can be effectively considered. It may be too early as yet to discuss the possible outlines of such a union, but a glance in that direction cannot be misplaced. Three terms apparently present themselves :—

1. Form of Central Control.
2. Cost of Central Control.
3. Method of Representation.

I do not attempt in these pages to do more than name these conditions as points for future discussion. It may be taken for granted, however, that no measure which in any way restricted the limits of local autonomy—which curbed the power of

the local governments in dealing with purely local affairs—would have any chance of acceptance with the colonies themselves. On the other hand, it is fair to assume—and experience justifies the assumption—that in matters of mutual or imperial concern—the colonies would be quite ready to act in concert with each other and with the mother country. There is obviously one matter in which every colony has a direct and a conjoint interest,—that of national defence. In the case of self-governing colonies this means in effect naval defence ; but as in the case of protected territories and intertropical extensions, internal disturbance may at times assume dimensions which necessitate the co-operation of imperial land forces, it is better to accept the larger term. It is generally admitted that the defence of the colonies from naval attack will practically be secured in northern waters and at the home base, and the colonies have therefore a direct interest in maintaining the efficiency and supremacy of the imperial navy.

This postulate being recognised, it follows that, in some way that has to be devised and agreed upon the colonies will have to be allowed a voice in matters of imperial administration. Two alternative methods of action have been suggested. One is the creation of a new consultative, if not governing, body, as a Council of Empire, in which the mother country and the colonies shall be proportionately repre-

sented. The other is the very simple process of adding colonial representatives to the House of Commons. Precedents for both courses may be said to exist in the former existence of the East India Council, and in the appointment of colonial members to the Privy Council. Already the nucleus of the machinery required for the constitution of an Imperial Council exists in the present Agent-Generalships, the dignity and importance of which develop year by year. Whatever plan may be decided upon as being best fitted to secure the end in view—effective representation of colonial interests in the policy and counsels of the empire—no insuperable difficulty is apparent in working out the problem.

Representation, however, implies taxation, not less than does the converse ; and if the colonies are to be granted a share in imperial administration or legislation, they must also be prepared to bear a proper contribution towards the cost of national defence. It is on every ground right and just that they should do so. More than that : such a contribution is absolutely indispensable as a condition of imperial unity and national safety. This, after all, is the main question that has to be grappled with. Speaking as a colonist, and as one who has taken some little part in inter-colonial deliberations, I have no hesitation in submitting to my fellow-colonists throughout the empire such a proposition of elementary duty. That it will

be loyally responded to, whenever formally presented, I cannot doubt. Canada, Australia, South Africa, have all, on repeated occasions, testified by voluntary acts their readiness to help in the defence of the empire. The despatch of expeditions to the Soudan, the offer of colonial contingents for service abroad, the maintenance of local squadrons, the gift of battle-ships, the free supply of coal, are all admirable in their way; but they are fitful and incoherent ebullitions of filial sentiment, rather than sustained and practical measures of united action. Is not the time at hand when some organised effort should be made to concentrate and consolidate these manifestations of colonial loyalty by a far-sighted and far-reaching policy, under which every colony should take its proper proportionate share of the task which now falls wholly on the shoulders of the yet unwearied Titan?

Many years ago in the pages of a quarterly periodical,¹ and subsequently on a public occasion in London, I ventured to hint at the contribution of a certain percentage of its yearly revenue by every colony to the imperial exchequer for purposes of naval defence. Ten years later a distinguished South African representative proposed the imposition of a preferential duty against outside producers with the same end in view. Though I prefer the former process as being

¹ See Appendix,

simpler and less aggressive, both suggestions serve to show that in the eyes of colonists the principle involved is right and equitable. Were all the oversea possessions of Great Britain to contribute, say two per cent. of their revenues for purposes of national defence, the imperial exchequer would to-day be richer by two and a quarter millions sterling per annum, or by any larger contribution in proportion. The burden thus imposed upon the colonial taxpayer would be trivial when compared with the enormous advantages of which it would be the proper equivalent.

These, however, are questions to be considered and dealt with, as occasion may arise, by the responsible representatives of the empire, whether imperial or colonial. That the time is ripening for the discussion, and, as I venture to hope, for the effective treatment of them, circumstances seem to indicate. Experience has shown, however, that time is lost rather than gained by precipitancy of action. It is folly to force the pace in so wide and divergent a field of policy. Public opinion on both sides of the ocean has to be aroused and educated before any definite results can be anticipated. It may be that the process of preparation will be long and tedious. It may be that some great national crisis will hasten the issue. In any case the people of this vast empire, in whatever part of it their lot may be cast, should keep in mind the dignity of their heritage as citizens, and the

magnitude of the responsibilities that attach thereto. Only by a readiness to share in common sacrifices and obligations can they hope to hold that empire together.

In the ancient city of Rome, where these pages were written, recent explorations have laid bare the architectural vestiges of an imperial past. From the crumbling parapets that crown the brow of the Palatine the eye now scans a waste of storied ruins. Where the visitor stands to-day rose the splendid palaces of the Cæsars, with all their accessories of luxury and regal life. There towards the Tiber stretched the vast expanse of the great Circus ; beyond rose the huge fabric of Caracalla's Baths. There, to the west, was the chief Forum, with its temples, its columns, its arches and its rostra, the centre and symbols of the city's public life. Above on the Capitoline height towered the fane dedicated to Jupiter, one of the most august shrines of the pagan world. Southward stood the beetling mass of the Colosseum, with its reek of slaughter, flanked by the commemorative arches of Titus and Constantine. In the background the glittering outlines of Nero's Golden House and Constantine's palace shut out the distant mountain ridges. All round, wherever the eye rested, pillared fanes and marble

fabrics, and spacious arenas, testified to the grandeur of the race, to the luxury and self-indulgence of an imperial people. That race then dominated the known world ; those people were drunken with the lust of conquest and dominion. To-day all is ruin and decay ; the mighty Roman empire is but a memory. What will be the fate of ours ? A century ago it was said of Englishmen :—

“Regions Cæsar never knew,

· · · · ·
· · · · ·

None invincible as they.”

Seventeen centuries hence what will be the vestiges in those regions of British rule and Anglo-Saxon supremacy ? The experience of this pregnant century has to some extent anticipated the answer. British colonisation will endure in effects, if not in name, because its foundations have been laid, as a whole, on the principles of humanity and justice. It will endure because it has so happened that the colonies have been nurtured through infancy during the long reign of a Sovereign whose name will ever be associated with the faithful and inflexible discharge of constitutional duty towards her subjects and her realms. It will endure because the prosperity of the colonies rests upon the basis of social development and honest toil. It will endure whether trade does or does not follow the flag ; though it is a fact beyond dispute that trade does follow the flag, and that trade will follow the

flag, as long as that flag, supported by an adequate navy, protects the free policy of a free empire. But of incomparably greater significance is it, that whatever the fluctuations or divergences of trade may be, the empire shall have manly effort and high character to sustain it. Those are the firmest buttresses of national strength and stability. Those are the indestructible guarantees of continuous national life. The commerce and opulence of Phœnicia and Carthage are forgotten ; the philosophy and culture of Greece, the laws, language, and literature of Rome, still move and influence the minds of men. The true greatness of the Roman empire is betokened not in the pathetic magnificence of its remains—not in its records of world-wide conquest, and insatiable dominion—but in the examples of wisdom and patriotism with which its history abounds. Looking as we have done at the development and experiences of British colonisation during the nineteenth century, are we not justified in believing that whatever destiny may be in store for the British empire during times to come, it will be said of it that civilisation has gained by its existence, and that the truest evidences of its greatness are written in the happier conditions—the general betterment—of mankind ?

APPENDIX

DURING the discussion which followed the reading of the paper which is incorporated in the preceding pages, doubt was expressed as to the possibility of any question having seriously arisen, thirty years ago, as to the propriety of retaining the colonies as part of the empire. It may serve to exemplify the trend of public opinion at that time if I reproduce here the following extracts from an article contributed by me to the *Westminster Review* for July, 1871, entitled "The Future of the British Empire." Certain other points dealt with in that article may also be of interest in the light of later developments.

Westminster Review, July, 1871.

THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

"To be, or not to be?" That is the question which, in a wider sense than Hamlet's, this great nation is now putting to itself concerning its own Imperial existence. Shall the British empire continue to be a term applicable to a world-wide system of territories and states, or shall it apply merely to a small insular

portion of the European continent? Shall the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" describe literally, and in fact, the limits of the Queen's rule? Shall that colonial empire which has been built up by means of so much individual sacrifice and toil, and which represents a sphere of political influence and national life, larger than has fallen to the lot of any other people, perish beneath dismemberment? Shall England abdicate her function as the mother of colonies, and force her sons, when necessity sends them from her shores, to find homes and citizenships in alien states? These are questions which surely are as well worth considering now as many other topics of more popular interest, but of far less gravity and significance.

Vast as our colonial empire is, it is by no means easy to describe the mode of its acquisition—England has colonised with no set political purpose—on no settled principle of action. Her colonies have spread and multiplied under the mere chance pressure of events. Like Topsy they have grown to their present proportions without any consciousness of the process on the part of their Imperial possessor. It cannot be said that in more than one or two instances this country has planted her flag on distant shores with distinct ideas of territorial aggrandisement, or even with any systematic intentions of colonisation. The British provinces of the now United States presented, perhaps, the most perfect examples of colonies

designedly formed by the State. Canada, the Cape Colony, Natal, Mauritius, and India, are the most conspicuous cases of possessions acquired by conquest, more with the view of humiliating a European foe and asserting national supremacy than with any material regard to their value as homes for British people and fields for British enterprise. The great Australian colonies may be considered to be self-grown. It is very improbable that the authorities who selected New South Wales as a convenient place for a convict settlement contemplated a time when a populous and civilised community should be formed there. British colonisation has, with scarcely an appreciable exception, been the work of private enterprise—the result of individual impulse on the part of outgoing British citizens. All that the State has done has been to assert its authority whenever a community came to need the exercise of governmental functions. According to the feeling so prevalent in many quarters, even this amount of interference would be grudged now. No one will deny that the possession of seaports and the control of coastlines were considered very much more important matters twenty and thirty years ago, and earlier, than they are held at present. The Fiji Islands in the Pacific Ocean afford a case in point. English settlers reside there, and the natives are anxious—or understood to be so—for British rule, but the home authorities have recently declined to bring them under the Queen's

sway. Fifty years ago annexation would have taken place almost as a matter of course.

In one sense, therefore, the responsibility of this country in connection with her colonies is less than it would be had they been born and reared under the fostering care of State interference. Had England, when taking possession of Australia and South Africa, publicly proclaimed her intention of establishing these communities of her expatriated citizens, and had she carried forward emigration as a national undertaking, it would scarcely be possible for her even to consider the possibility of their abandonment, or to withdraw from them her protection, unless with their express concurrence. But as it is, her obligations are binding enough. Writers and speakers, in dealing with this question, seem often to lose sight of its moral aspects. Do moral rules apply to nations as well as to individuals? If so, then is a nation justified, after accepting and exercising rule over a country throughout a lengthened period, in proposing to abdicate that power when its possession becomes irksome, or seems likely to entail unforeseen responsibilities? The recognition of British rule has in all our colonies led men to settle and form homes there, to invest their industry and their capital, to expend their efforts and make all their arrangements on the understanding that they and their sons lost no rights of British citizenship by migration to the other, but still English-governed lands. Nor does the fact of

self-government having been given to these communities seem to us to diminish the moral force of the obligations thus created. When these free constitutions were granted, nothing was said of their being the foreshadowing of complete separation. They were given as much to suit the convenience of home statesmen as to meet the view of the colonists, and we very much doubt whether the latter would have cared to accept a boon fraught with such perilous and distasteful consequences.

But before we proceed to consider the main question at issue, let us glance as swiftly as we can, with due regard for the comprehension of facts, at the growth and the present position of our colonial possessions. Their manner of growth has been about as unregulated and inharmonious as their mode of acquisition. Spontaneous emigration has peopled them all. In Canada easy facilities for acquiring land have drawn people there. In Australia gold has been the chief magnet. Where these agencies have not been at work, colonisation, as at the Cape, has advanced but slowly. In India, for we cannot but regard that conquered country as a colony, material growth in all that makes modern states prosperous has been a recent development. Even there—the grandest field for systematic action by a civilising state that any empire possessed—private enterprise has been the chief operant. Railway construction, tea and cotton culture, and mining industry, all owe their being and

their progress to private effort, rather than to Imperial statesmanship.

To people these lands, to occupy these wildernesses, to create this trade, to produce these staples, our countrymen have gone forth year by year, carrying with them strong English energies, moved by a spirit of English enterprise and firm in the belief that they were bearing to their new homes all the rights and guarantees of English citizenship. Men do not lightly change their nationality. Of what force would be the time-honoured sentiment of patriotism if men could so freely cast aside the citizenship they are born unto, as would be the case did British colonists not carry with them the conviction that they were but moving from one part of the empire to another. The Scotch are among the most frequent colonisers; but no countryman is so tenacious of his nationality as the Scot. It is not affirming too much to say that the success of British colonisation has been largely due to the fact that it *is* British. Why should people go to distant, savage, or obscure lands, instead of to America, unless they were loth to lose their citizenship as Englishmen? It is this natural instinct which has led so many of our migrating fellow subjects to choose rather the alternative of having to battle with life's hard conditions under all the strange circumstances of a new land, than part with what they have been accustomed to consider their birthright.

England has thus without any set plan or purpose gained for herself an empire more varied and world-wide than any previously acquired by any other power. Rome conquered and colonised systematically, and sent her armies forth with the avowed object of spreading her dominion. But even her possessions, vast and splendid as they were, could not compare in their influence on the world at large with those of his country. The command of South Africa, Australasia, and the Falkland Islands, with Mauritius and St. Helena, makes England practically the mistress of the southern seas. India secures her dominance in Southern and Eastern Asia. Almost the whole of North America belongs to men sprung from her loins and speaking her tongue, and secures Anglo-Saxon supremacy on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Nor has the impress of British rule been confined merely to the proofs of British dominion. The countries subdued have taken an entirely British character, in society, in industry, in institutions, and in domestic order. England's colonies have not merely been Anglicised by the presence of her military and the sway of her proconsuls. They have been formed and made *Br.* English by her own sons and daughters. England's relation towards all her colonies, except India, is not that which she held towards the Ionian Islands, or which Rome held towards ancient Britain. In these cases the only claim which the ruling power had upon

the population under it, was the claim of might. When the Eagles quitted the shores of Albion, and the Union Jack was hauled down at Corfu, no wrong was done the inhabitants. They ceased to be Roman or English subjects, but they remained as much as ever English and Ionian. Were England to withdraw herself from Canada, South Africa, and Australia, the colonists of these countries—in other words the inhabitants—who were born British subjects like their fathers before them, would find themselves abruptly denationalised, and left to build up for themselves a new name and an alien citizenship. Roman citizens did not emigrate *en masse* to Britain, nor did English colonists settle largely in Corfu. Had either done so there would have been some analogy between their case and that of the British-born men who are now threatened with the doom of Imperial abandonment.

There is neither extravagance nor impropriety in realising for a moment the splendour of the empire which thus has come, unsought and self-created, into the grasp of England. It does, as the working men of this country lately declared, constitute “a national inheritance,” to which history presents no parallel. It contains corn lands vast enough to feed mankind through ages that are yet remote. Its stores of coal, gold and iron, no man dare estimate. It embraces varieties of race so numerous and so great that no shade of colour is wanting, nor is any type of man absent from the motley ranks of the Queen’s subjects.

It prevails on the shores of every ocean, and covers these seas with the richest commerce of the world. It holds out to every struggling citizen at home, worn down by want, or pressed hard by the hot forces of competition, the chance of a wider sphere for his energies and a bettered position for his offspring, in lands that are still under the British flag. It has had a penetrating though imperceptible influence in every department of Anglo-Saxon life, and during the last thirty years the society, trade, and enterprise of the United Kingdom have been modified by its conditions and expanded by its wants.

Why should an empire so fraught with elements of glory to our nation suffer dismemberment? In plain words, why should the colonies be given up? Two pleas only can be assigned. The first is that the retention of these colonies adds to the military and naval expenditure of the mother country. The second is that they involve her in irksome and undue national responsibilities.

In considering this question we have to do with the present, not the past. It is idle to inquire what the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain has been; we have only to take it as it is. Owing to the defectiveness of statistical information in this country, it is no easy matter to ascertain, exactly, what is the naval and military expenditure incurred by the Imperial Government on account of colonies. As regards the first, we believe it would be impossible

to set down any exact figures, but it is enough for our purpose to take the military expenditure. Were we to accept implicitly what we read and what we hear, we should conclude that a large proportion of the cost of the army was imposed upon this country by her colonies. When so many people still believe that England bears the cost of governing her dependencies, and pays the salaries of their governors, it is not strange that yet a larger number should imagine the expense of defending those countries to be much larger than it is. As a fair specimen of the way in which usually well-informed journals speak of this question, and unintentionally mislead their readers concerning it, let us quote the following passage from the leading article of a moderate and influential weekly :—

“ It is certainly not required by equity—nor in our judgment by sound policy—that the British workman should be mulcted of a portion of his hard earnings, in order that the much more prosperous and hopeful colonist should escape the pecuniary pressure which adverse circumstances may chance to throw upon him.”

These words are but an echo of innumerable others that from time to time are uttered through the pages of newspapers and pamphlets. They hint darkly but directly enough at an oppressive expenditure borne mostly by suffering workmen at home for the sake and benefit of flourishing colonists abroad. They embody the sum of the whole argument of those who maintain that the colonies cost more than they are worth.

Nothing can in point of fact be more fallacious than this reasoning. The British workman is no more mulcted of his earnings than any other class. The expenditure falls upon the general revenue, and as such is a burden borne by all classes of the community. The workman is mulcted no more than the great absentee proprietor, investor in colonial stocks, or shipper of goods to colonial clients, who while they benefit largely by the openings for profitable investment afforded by the colonies, do not directly contribute to the cost of the government of those territories. The tables might with great justice be turned, and the thousands of persons in this country who make money out of colonies asked, whether it is equitable that they should benefit so largely by the existence of those colonies, and yet take so little part in the maintenance of their institutions. But so far as the "British workman" is concerned, the best and most decisive answer to these objections is found in the now celebrated "petition of the unemployed," where the working men of England declare that they look upon the colonies as a great national inheritance, where they or their children may find opportunities of advancement from which they are rigorously excluded here. And this is in truth the case. The bulk of the settlers in the colonies have sprung from the "workmen" class, and there is yet scope for the formation of countless homes under conditions utterly unattainable by the same class in the Old World.

Upon another point much misconception prevails. Colonists are popularly spoken of as though they were, each and all, men of ease and wealth, and therefore better able to bear taxation than their fellow citizens in England. In the first place, they are much more heavily taxed than are the people of this country. The average rate of taxation borne by the people of the United Kingdom is, say, £2 5s. per head. Throughout the colonies the average is from £4 to £5 per head. And in the second place, it is a mistake to suppose that their position in a tax-bearing point of view is so superior to that of the average of their home countrymen. This is what a colonist says upon this subject :—

“It may seem that the progress of trade, as set forth by figures, indicates unbounded prosperity, and an ease of production which entails inappreciable effort. If such an impression be conveyed, it is a false one. The prosperity of the colonies is by no means exceptional, nor are colonists, as a rule, wealthy people. Their produce, though abundant, is not always remunerative, and is often only marketable at rates which leave but a slight margin of profit to the producer. Labour, in many cases, is not only exceedingly scarce, but unduly dear. Transport is always an oppressive charge. Colonies are mostly lands of magnificent distances and of indifferent roads, and, even where railways are established, there are usually special taxes required which have to be reckoned against profits. In some countries there are risks of loss from fire, drought, flood, or other special causes, for which provision and allowance have to be made. The rapid increase in production has a direct tendency to reduce prices, although there may be no corre-

sponding reduction in the expenses of production. Out of the £143,000,000 worth of raw materials exported to other countries from the colonies, I believe it to be more than probable that foreign dealers and manufacturers make a far larger proportion of gain than do the actual producers. It must not, therefore, be assumed that, because the trade of the colonies has exhibited such rapid expansion, and now has attained to such vast amounts, the colonists themselves are, as individuals, proportionately opulent or inordinately prosperous. That many of them have made and are making fortunes is probably the case, as it is with persons in other parts of the world; but as to colonists in general, the advantage of their condition rests rather in greater independence than in superior wealth."

Her colonial empire, therefore, costs England £1,000,000 per annum, or about 9*d.* yearly per head of the population of the United Kingdom. This, then, is the point at issue—this is the actual and positive financial interest which this country has at stake in the matter. The fact cannot be too plainly stated, or too generally understood. But let us ask whether, were the amount ten times what it is, the Crown would not be bound to support itself by garrisons of its own troops, if need be, in all parts of the empire? For we presume the colonies are parts of the empire as much as is Ireland or the Isle of Wight. The mere fact of distance surely cannot weaken the claim of any one part of the empire to equal consideration and equal protection with the rest. Let us suppose that Ireland were a thousand miles, instead of sixty miles, distant from England, would the Government

of Great Britain therefore feel less bound to guard it from invasion, or to do justice to its suffering people? Does not the very idea of empire imply the obligation incumbent upon the ruling power to protect its possessions from encroachment—the capacity to hold its own at every point of its dominions? In all ages of the world, and under Roman supremacy more particularly, the defence of distant extremities has been esteemed of equal importance in the maintenance of empire, with the protection of centres. England's present policy is just the reverse of this rule. Outlying members are left helpless to take care of themselves, and the resources of the empire are concentrated upon the parent-islands.

When we come to analyse yet more severely the distribution of the military forces of Great Britain, the fallacy and the unfairness of the statements and arguments used by anti-colonial philosophers become surprisingly transparent. We have already given the broad cost of military expenditure in the colonies, and have excluded from the calculation the garrisons at Malta, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Halifax, and China. These stations are all necessary to a nation which claims still to be the leading maritime power—whose merchant shipping still dominates the sea, and whose commerce continues to be the largest, richest, and most flourishing in the world. The possession of such fortified and garrisoned ports of call and bases of action in all seas is obviously essential to the

security of such a trade. Where would the shipping trade of England be, in the event of war with a naval power, had she not safe havens of her own at Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, Halifax, the West Indies, Ascension, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, Cape Coast Castle, Simon's Bay, Cape Town, Mauritius, Aden, Singapore, Ceylon, Hong Kong, the Falkland Islands, and the Australasian harbours? This list is a long one, but it only gives a partial idea, after all, of the vast girdle of insular and coast settlements by means of which, it is not saying too much to affirm, the trade of Great Britain is what it is. Had the United States, during its civil war, possessed, like England, harbours and naval stations in every sea and on every shore, it would have been out of the power of an *Alabama* to drive her shipping from the seas, and ruin her trade for almost a generation.

These stations, however, are not colonies in the strict sense of the term, and we do not include them in our calculation. There is one way of arriving at a tolerably accurate estimate of Imperial expenditure accessible by everybody—we mean by reference to the list of places where the Queen's regiments are stationed. If our readers will consult the latest army list, they will find that in South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia—the colonies chiefly in question—there are not at this moment six regiments stationed. These regiments, therefore, with a small accompaniment of men from the Artillery and Engineers'

Corps, constitute all the garrisons in colonies that are properly so-called, Canada being excepted for special reasons. When from these we make further allowance for the garrisons which, under any circumstances, the home Government would probably be desirous to maintain at Cape Town and Mauritius, we shall find that the actual cost of military service for the colonies is much less than the amount nominally set down in Mr. Cardwell's estimate.

There is in reality substantial need of military aid in New Zealand, South Africa, and the West Coast settlements only. In all these settlements, we believe that the presence of a certain number of the Queen's troops is indispensable, not so much for the active use they might be as for the influence their presence exerts. To quote the words of a colonial writer:—

“We lately pointed out that the Imperial Government was, so far as Natal was concerned, under a legal and expressed obligation to maintain a force here, so long as the colony was unable to defend itself. That period has not yet arrived. The colony has yet neither means nor organisation. We are but 17,000 Europeans amongst nearly a million barbarians, over whom, happily for us, the British Government has acquired a moral influence and prestige, which for the time are better than the largest army. But that influence and prestige are sustained by the belief deeply implanted in the native mind, that they could be enforced if need be by the exercise of illimitable resources. On more than one occasion the natives have seen, starting, as it were, from the sea in an incredibly short period, large and well-armed forces of trained troops. They look upon

the small garrison stationed here as the symbol of vaster forces out of sight. They know that the great English Sovereign lives not in Africa, but in a far distant country, where, surrounded by countless hosts, she holds rule over world-wide realms.

“If the troops be withdrawn from South Africa, as they are being so ruthlessly from New Zealand, all this prestige must perish, and its repressive effects will disappear with it. In the eyes of the natives, the Queen will have abandoned us, and British rule will, in fact, cease to be. It cannot be otherwise, and we beg most distinctly to bring the alternative before the notice of all concerned. Does England wish to withdraw from South Africa as she has withdrawn from New Zealand? Does she wish all the blood and treasure she has spent in asserting her supremacy in these territories, and in bringing the natives under submission to her higher civilisation, to go for naught? Does she wish to leave other and rival powers free to take her place on this southern seaboard?”

Still, although the military requirements of South Africa and New Zealand are so exceptional and urgent, they do not, so far as we can see, necessitate any departure from the principle we have sought to lay down. If Great Britain is bound to defend one of her colonies, she is bound to defend all; if she abandons one on the plea of military expenditure, she must, as a logical necessity, abandon the rest. The empire cannot be dismembered piecemeal. If the vast and glorious structure, raised through so many ages by so much toil and sacrifice, is to fall to pieces, the collapse will be sudden and complete rather than partial and gradual.

One of the chief counts in the indictment against colonies is that their commercial legislation is hostile to the interests of the mother country. We are told that their tariffs are protective and designedly injurious to home manufactures. It is true that some colonies, for the purpose of encouraging native industry, do impose high rates of duty on articles that are capable of local production, and so far as they do so for that purpose we are unable to approve their policy, although we admit the colonists are so circumstanced as to be very strongly tempted to adopt it. Their high tariffs may, however, be defended on other grounds by reasons, the force of which, we believe, will be generally recognised. Colonies stand in peculiar need of railways and all manner of public works. The taxable population is scanty and poor, and taxable commodities are extremely rare. How is revenue to be obtained to pay for these works and to sustain the colonial government, except a customs department be created? Customs dues are universally admitted to be one of the fairest, easiest, and most equal forms of taxation; and it should be borne in mind that the fruits of the tariff do not come directly out of the pockets of people at home: the evils incident to a high tariff are mainly endured by the colonists themselves, while the mother country derives a certain though indefinite benefit from the results of its expenditure in the maintenance of law and order, the construction of

public works, and the payment of interest on loans obtained from home investors.

We must confess, too, that if the colonists liked to retort, they could do so with greater reason than their assailants, by a reference to the different sugar duties—a far more unjust fiscal system than anything attempted in any colony. In scarcely any instance is an export duty imposed upon the raw material sent home in such abundance to supply the mills and factories, where so many millions of England's toilers find employment, and so many thousands of England's citizens find wealth. What if Australia, India, the West Indies, and South Africa were to be left free to follow in the footsteps of the United States—to impose prohibitive duties on imported commodities, or by similar fiscal charges to crush the export of raw staples? Suppose that the import of wool from Australia, of cotton from India, of raw sugar from the Mauritius and the West Indies, ceased, what would become of the spinning, weaving, and refining interests of Great Britain? It is quite a mistake to imagine that the United Kingdom would do as much trade with the colonies, were they separated, as it does now. Most of the oldest mercantile houses in these colonies are the fruit of British enterprise, and would never have been established had the British ensign not waved over the lands in which their operations are carried on. We are pointed to America; we are shown how capital and population

flow in from these shores into that country, notwithstanding the independence of its Government and the rivalry of its flag. But it must not be forgotten that the United States are nothing more than the extreme outcome of our colonial system ; that their enterprise, and progress, and capital, and power spring from Anglo-Saxon energy, and are shaped on the Anglo-Saxon model ; and that, had it not been for the colonising and aggressive instincts of Anglo-Saxon emigrants, that great source of wealth and activity to this country would have had no compact existence. Nor can we refrain from repeating the oft-told truism, that were America still within the arms of the empire, England would be free from her darkest menace, and her trade delivered from the keenest rivalry. Have the representatives of our shipping and manufacturing interests ever seriously considered what their position, and the position of this whole country would be, were the colonial possessions of Great Britain in the hands of independent or alien powers at war with us? In such a case the boasted commerce of Great Britain—the only thing, according to some amongst us, worth considering or maintaining—would stand in greater danger than it did after the Trent affair, and be liable to even more terrible disasters than were inflicted by one Confederate privateer upon the commerce of the United States.

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It is said that the colonies would do as much trade with us as they do now were they free. This, too, is a fallacy not warranted by the experience of the world. Were this the case, the island of Mauritius after its capture, and the Cape Colony after its conquest, ought still to have traded chiefly with their parent states—France and Holland. The fact is, that their commercial connections with those countries are very partial when compared with the trade they do with the United Kingdom. Look at the growing tendency of American trade to confine itself to American limits and to cultivate continental markets. Now that European manufacturers are running our own manufacturers so close, and in many cases turning out articles of equal quality at lower rates, it is worth considering whether, on economical grounds, it is well to alienate communities whose chief market both for purchase and sale is Britain, and who in the nature of things will retain that preference for this country so long as they share its citizenship and boast the protection of its flag.

Then there is the very numerous class of investors to whom colonial securities and colonial bonds offer more remunerative investments than they can obtain here. Four years ago no less a sum than £145,000,000 sterling represented the funded debt of India and the colonies. By this time very probably the aggregate has reached £200,000,000, all of which has been advanced by bondholders in this country,

and upon which interest varying from five to six per cent. is regularly paid. As every colony with advancing age goes deeper into debt for the purpose of providing itself with necessary public works, this aggregate is likely to increase year by year. So long as the colonies remain British dependencies, the security for these bonds is excellent, especially as, in most cases, provision is made in the shape of a sinking fund for the extinguishment of the debt. In addition to these governmental loans, many millions more are invested by persons and institutions at home in colonial mortgages and other private securities ; in colonial banks and other financial institutions ; in mining and other industrial enterprises. Would the confidence which these investors have in colonial securities and investments exist were the colonies forced to become small and petty republics, the scenes of party warfare and political anarchy, or the prey of some rapacious and unscrupulous foreign power? If American bonds are unpopular in the monetary circles of England, what position would be held by those of states struggling prematurely with the responsibilities of self-government, possessed as yet of no fixed and settled principles of political action, in point of population and revenue less influential than one of the United States, and driven perhaps by stress of circumstances, unsought by them, to repudiate their obligations and to destroy their credit? It is without question the fact that our

colonies are under the British flag that leads the people and investors of this country to make such large use of colonial securities. The colonies are the outlet for the savings of the British people.

Having thus as briefly as we could glanced at the leading aspects of this question, let us categorically and concisely set forth the probable consequences of the abandonment by Great Britain of her colonies. They may be stated thus:—

Curtailment of trade, and subsequent loss of employment for the toilers of the nation.

Diminution of supplies of raw staples for manufacture.

Shutting up of safe securities for the profitable investment of superfluous wealth and redundant capital.

Loss of suitable fields for outgoing enterprise and languishing industry.

Diminution of the population of the empire, seeing that in every outgoing emigrant a subject of the Crown and a citizen of the State would be lost.

Deprivation of ports of refuge in case of war. Now all the world may be said to be open to British cruisers. Without her colonies England might find her ships shelterless on the high seas.

Loss of national prestige. England is now respected by other nations because her ships sweep every sea ; because her flag floats over free communities in every zone ; because under her flag men of all nationalities and colours enjoy equal rights and share a

common citizenship ; because her race and language, more than any other, pervade the world.

Loss of nationality by all outgoing English people. Men compelled to emigrate by the pressure of circumstances, the want of employment, or the lack of opportunity in this over-crowded island, if they wish to exercise any rights of citizenship must become aliens and foreigners.

Loss of territories where the army can by frequent change and constant exercise be kept well fitted for active service, and inured to the hardships and vicissitudes of actual warfare. In the words of a most competent authority, Sir George Grey :—

“That man would be a bold one who would say that it was not this training which enabled them (*i.e.*, British troops) to discharge their duties in a manner which they could not have done if they had been simply trained in garrison towns at home. Our troops were distributed throughout the world in such a manner as to enable a force to be at once collected at any threatened point.”

Loss of openings where the youth of England can find ample scope for their business aptitudes, social aspirations, or political ambition.

The sacrifice of lands which the “unemployed” have styled the “national inheritance,” by the help of which they and others like them may help to better their condition.

Transference of what now constitutes the strength and the glory of this country to independent or rival powers. Should America, Prussia, or any other rising

power take a helpless but abandoned colony under its protection, England's loss will be the other nation's gain.

The narrowing and debasement of national aspirations ; the recognition of a low standard of patriotism ; the measuring of State duties by a money-test ; the sacrifice of national honour and good faith to a false and fatal economy.

And finally, as regards the colonies themselves, the imposition on them of distasteful and burdensome responsibilities ; the infliction on them of confused and anarchic conditions ; the withdrawal of that supreme controlling power by which their political destinies are shaped and influenced ; the exposure of some of them to bloody outbreaks and servile disturbances ; and the implanting amongst them of embittered and hostile feelings towards the land of their fathers.

Surely this is an array of evils dire enough to deter any reasonable Government from a policy which might entail such a heritage of disaster. Nor do we think that when once the statesmen and people of this country come fairly to look upon the question in all its aspects, and to comprehend more clearly its practical issues, they will fail any longer to see that it will be far, far better to reconstruct and consolidate than to dismember and disown the empire which is the outcome of so many sacrifices and the theme of so much laudation.

The colonists generally seem agreed that if all Imperial protection is to be withdrawn from their shores under the present state of things, independence must follow as a logical and a practical necessity. But they also seem to think that a middle course might be followed. Why should the supreme responsible control of colonial affairs, they ask, continue to be vested in a minister whose knowledge and experience have not specially fitted him for their administration? Why should not the relations of the central Government and its dependencies be so modified that, with increased responsibilities towards each other, a closer connection, a more complete interdependence should be established. The idea of a federal union between the colonies and the mother country is a very popular one, and opinions only differ as to how such an arrangement can be brought about. Two plans are proposed. One has a wider and loftier scope and purpose than the other, and takes the form of a Council of Empire, in which the United Kingdom, India, and the colonies should be represented in proportion to their area and population. With this body would rest the issues of peace or war, and the levying of taxes for the maintenance of Imperial defences. The other plan is that a Colonial Council should be created, composed of representatives sent by the different colonies, and that this body, presided over by the Secretary of State for the time being, should be invested with control over such

subjects as the appointment of governors and other officers who may have to be nominated at home ; the regulation of tariffs ; the conduct of emigration, and the appropriation of unoccupied waste lands. Such a council would be an extension of the India Board, only it must necessarily, in order that it shall possess the confidence of the colonists, partake of a representative character. Canada would have to send five members, one for each of her principal divisions ; Australia, five ; New Zealand, two ; the West Indies, four ; Cape Colony, Natal, West Coast, Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Eastern Islands, one each. The Secretary and Under-Secretary of State would represent home interests in this assembly. The duties of the council would, of necessity, be largely executive ; and in dealing with measures relating to particular colonies, the minister would be materially and chiefly guided by the advice of the representative of that particular dependency ; while, in all general questions and administrative acts, he would act in concert with the whole body.

Were such a council in existence, it is more than probable that the colonies would gladly consent to pay a certain contribution, to be fixed by such a body, towards the naval and military expenditure of the empire. New Zealand and South Africa, as we have pointed out, are the only colonies where it is necessary to maintain a standing garrison of any consequence. But in regard to naval expenditure, all the colonies

have an equal interest in it. It is through that branch of outlay alone that they could expect to be protected from invasion or attack should England be at war with a naval power. It is but just that a reasonable contribution towards the national outlay in this service should be made. The combined revenues of the colonies amount now to about £20,000,000 sterling ; a charge of five per cent. on that, the most equitable way of assessing the contribution, would yield £1,000,000, or about the present gross amount of military expenditure in our self-governed dependencies. A like charge on the Indian revenue, which in 1866 was about £50,000,000, would yield £2,500,000, making a very just and generous contribution towards the maintenance of our navy. The colonies, we believe, would not object to such a charge. Were they independent they would have to keep up some kind of naval defences at probably a much higher cost ; and the presence of their representatives at headquarters would be an assurance that their wants would be intelligently understood and practically attended to. Under the present system, the geography of our colonies is so imperfectly understood at the War Office, that stations in different colonies, separated by hundreds of miles of savage country, are sometimes referred to, and dealt with, as being in one and the same locality.

We do not put forward these suggestions as being absolutely the only plan that might be proposed, or

as being the best mode of meeting the difficulty. It is probable that when the constructive genius of our statesmen is brought to bear upon this truly Imperial question, a better system may be devised. Our only object is to show that it is possible to establish such a union as of late has often been hinted at, but never specifically described. The same suggestions are being made, the same framework of a central government proposed, in the colonies themselves. Before an idea can be condemned as impracticable, it must be definitely stated, and if there are insuperable difficulties in the way of the scheme, let us hear them. We must frankly confess that as yet we have heard none.

This plan more especially commends itself because under it Great Britain could afford to grant to her colonies the utmost powers of internal self-government, while the colonies could afford, if need be, to sacrifice in certain matters a certain portion of their right to act independently. It admits of honourable concession on both sides. It would be the policy and the interest equally of the mother country and the colonies to keep on good terms with each other. The home taxpayer could no longer reproach the colonist with being a burden ; the colonist could no longer charge the home Government with the ignorant exercise of power. It would be then no less than now the true policy of England to accustom her dependencies to the exercise of responsibility in the management of their own affairs,

and to free herself from all accountability for interference in any of their domestic concerns. But it would also be far less the interest and object of England to force upon young and incapable states the weighty responsibilities of self-government, and to turn adrift into the turbid waters of Republicanism infant communities with imperfect social organisations and inadequate political vigour.

If England is unable, as Rome did, to send her legions forth for the protection of all quarters of the empire, she can at any rate help her citizens in those distant districts to defend themselves. Under an efficient and practical colonial administration at home, much that is now impracticable might be done in this direction. Military settlements of discharged soldiers might be formed in particular districts. The right to form one in such settlements might be held out to the army as a reward for good service. A plan based upon this principle was submitted last year to the Society of Arts by Colonel Maude, V.C., and there can be little doubt that it presents an admirably feasible mode of providing for the defensive needs of the colonies, and of promoting the efficiency of the army. Trained instructors might be sent out for the improvement of colonial forces ; these forces might be affiliated with the home troops, and Imperial rank assigned to them ; Imperial guns and munitions of war might be supplied on favourable terms, and every effort made to make service in colonial corps at-

tractive and honourable. After all, the doing these things is but the ordinary duty of an Imperial and paternal Government. If our colonies are to become in all but name independent, it ought to be both our pride and pleasure to fit them to hold their own against the world, and to make them worthy offshoots of the parent tree.

The action of a Colonial Council would not only compass all these matters, but it would also tend to have an expanding and invigorating influence upon the political condition of this nation. It would help us to keep pace with the age—this wonderful age, so marked by the rapidity of improvement, so stirred by the strivings of social and political development. To the popular mind it may seem a ridiculous idea that thirty or forty colonists gathered from all parts of the world, many of them sent from lands only just rescued from the wilderness, should have any sensible influence upon civilisation of this old and lordly nation. But those who know what changes are worked by Anglo-Saxon colonisation will see no absurdity in the supposition. Colonists are accustomed to disregard or to scrutinise very narrowly every species of conventionalism. Prescriptive rights they know not. Carvers out themselves of new social orders, constructors of new political systems, they look at questions with less timidity of mind and greater fertility of purpose than men who are fettered by usage and clogged by precedent. It must be that

when the personal influence and co-operation of such men are brought to bear in the councils of the nation, when the eager progressiveness of the colonist is associated with the calmer impulses of the home citizen, an effect more or less potent will be produced.

But the chief value of such an organisation to this country would lie in its utility as a means of promoting emigration on a large and systematic scale. The past apathy of our Government, and, indeed, of the nation generally, upon this question, is one of the anomalies of our history. Year by year, for half a century, Englishmen and Englishwomen have left our shores to form new homes in distant lands without any recognition of the outgoing tendency by the State. Year by year the numbers of English paupers have multiplied, and the poor rates paid by English citizens have waxed heavier, without an effort being made on the part of the Government or of the parochial authorities to mitigate these evils by the transplanting of our surplus population to these remote possessions. The increase of pauperism in a country of such set limits, and under such a system of land tenure as ours, has been a physical and social necessity. Given a population increasing in a certain ratio, living in a small island where the soil is owned by large proprietors, and the outgrowth of pauperism becomes almost a mathematical certainty. Parochial statistics bear melancholy proof that it is so. According to Mr. Preston's interesting pamphlet, £10,303,000

were paid for poor rates in 1867, and £11,061,000 in 1868, showing an increase of £757,000. Pauperism costs us eleven millions sterling yearly already, and the annual increase is at the rate of three-quarters of a million ! This is almost the cost of our national army. And yet not a finger has been lifted in order to establish some system by which the country might be relieved from such a frightful incubus of misery—from such a quick-growing fungus of taxation.

English statesmen write voluminous despatches to show that the colonies must defend themselves, and by so doing run the risk of severing those colonies from the empire. English statesmen see pauperism and poor rates together blighting and burdening the land ; and yet the cost of military defence for the colonies is but a million, an eleventh part of what we pay for the maintenance in mendicancy of our poor. And in those colonies there is room enough and to spare for the comfortable location, under changed and hopeful circumstances, of all the unemployed of Britain for generations yet.

We ask a question which is now being often put in one or other of the colonies. Why cannot these poor rates be employed in transporting to and maintaining for a limited period in Canada, Australia, or Africa the destitute persons for whose relief so much now has to be paid ? Under the present system pauperism increases, and poor rates grow, without any apparent prospect of the diminution of either.

There is no compensating element in the system. It is bad because it leads people to look for, or depend on, parochial relief in times of scarcity. It is bad because it is alike unproductive and unprofitable. Were a certain portion of these poor rates spent in locating industriously disposed "unemployed" in our colonies, poor rates would be attacked at their source, and the burden they inflict would correspondingly diminish. Persons who are now the consumers at the public cost of food raised by others, would become the producers of food and the employers of labour, pauperism would decline, and production would advance.

Our colonies are willing enough to supply the land required for the location of these suffering people, but the sparseness of their numbers and the many calls upon them for expenditure under other necessary heads, debars them from doing more. It would be, however, for the State and the parishes together to do the rest. The one could furnish means of transport in the shape of vessels that could not be better employed, as proposed by Captain Bedford Pim, the other could supply funds for the maintenance of the emigrants during the first year of their settlement. The mere cost of conveyance would be far from enough, as our colonies would not thank us for shiploads of destitute people, unprovided with the means of subsistence until their own crops grew. This class of emigrants would have to be provided at the outset with rations,

implements, and shelter. They might be, if deemed desirable, required to repay within a certain period some of the cost of this assistance, but we doubt the expediency of exacting such a stipulation. In India as much as £300 per man has been paid for the housing of European soldiers. For how very much less a sum might we place in a position of comfort for life men who are now the menace of order and the incipient germs of revolution, but who might be converted into an industrial army, whereby wild lands would be tamed and fertilised, and new realms conquered to Christianity and civilisation.

There are unfortunately strong interests adverse to any movement whereby emigration as a cure for pauperism should be made a national question. There are those who look upon a chronic percentage of "unemployed" as a happy regulator of the cost of labour. Emigration will draw off the unemployed, and leave the masters at the mercy of those that remain, say these opponents. You have no right to deprive England of her bone and sinew—of her labouring power—of that which has constituted her glory and her strength. But all the time while this appeal to national selfishness is being made, the cries of pauperism wax louder and louder, and the burden of poor rates gets heavier and heavier. Where is it to end, if some remedial movement be not made? Will relief come from agriculture, when the rural labourer is declared to be the worst paid species of operative, and

when the value of land and the employment of machinery increase yearly? Will relief come from increased manufacturing enterprise, when continental competitors are every year pressing our own manufacturers more closely? Will relief come from the diminished increase of population, so long as destitution and misery keep the lower classes ignorant of their duties as citizens, and reckless of their interests as men? It seems to us, in common with many others, that the efforts which are now being made by certain philanthropic bodies and individuals to promote the emigration of the unemployed, might, if our statesmen are not blind to the tendencies of the time and the exigencies of our society, result in making emigration the charge of a new and distinct department of the State.

For if the ideas we have attempted to sketch, and the proposals we have ventured to put forth, be worth anything, the answer to all objections will be found in the response, that in removing the unemployed from England to the colonies we are but shifting our citizens from one part of the empire to another. They will be no less subjects of the Queen—members of the Anglo-Saxon body politic—in Australia or in Africa than in Lancashire or in Dorset. The only difference will be that there they will add directly to the strength and prosperity of the empire, while here they will be but a burden and a stigma upon it. There they will produce staples which will feed or

employ their countrymen at home and elsewhere. Here they only consume without producing. There society will gladden under their presence, and earth will bloom beneath their labours. Here society is darkened by their existence, and earth is burdened by their woes.

We have thus sought, as well as we can, to place before our readers certain aspects of this question most deserving, as it seems to us, of consideration. The subject in its entirety is so large and fruitful that volumes might be written upon it. Yet there are a few more salient points, which it would be well for the home public to have clearly in mind ere any judgment be formed. In a preceding page we have summarised certain consequences which would probably follow the abandonment by England of her colonies. Let us now set forth some of the advantages likely to accrue from the reconstruction and consolidation of the Empire, namely :—

Trade will be retained and extended, instead of being diverted to other countries, as surely it would be were the colonies to become independent, with reasons for ill-will against this country, or were they to pass under the protection of other powers.

England would still possess lands where for long ages yet the overflowings of her population might find healthful homes and remunerative work.

England will still have at command safe investments for her fast-increasing savings and redundant

capital. Nine millions sterling are now paid by India and the colonies yearly upon the funds advanced by British investors on their bonds and debentures. Every year adds to the amount borrowed, the recognition of British rule being the main element of security.

There will continue to be within the bounds of the British empire opportunities of honourable advancement, of social and political distinction, open to young men of every grade. This is an age when the spread of education produces a proportionately large number of men who aspire to a superior station in life than they were born in, and who long for the chance of public activity. Within the vast sphere of our colonial dominion the laudable ambition of our youth may find a fit and ample arena.

Such a confederation of English-speaking peoples, bound together by common interests, and compacted in an elastic political union, could hardly fail to have a pacifying influence in the world, and would enable England, in the strength of her unity and the vastness of her dominions, to bring her neutrality to bear in the arbitration of international quarrels, and become once more "an umpire among European Powers."

By sharing the burden of her naval and military expenditure with communities which become every year richer and more populous, England would in course of time find that her own liabilities under these heads would gradually get less and less.

There would be secured to the national genius a finer field for its energies, and nobler objects for its attainment. The narrowness bred by insularity would give place to greater breadth of view, catholicity of spirit, nobleness of purpose ; patriotism would be less marred by national selfishness ; little by little the individuality of our race would take a higher form and receive a wider signification. To be an Anglo-Saxon would mean all that to be a Roman meant in the grandeur of territorial sway, but far more than that phrase meant in the rights of citizenship, in the co-ordination of Imperial supremacy, civil liberty, and personal responsibility.

This is a time of political strife, moral struggle, and social change. How fit that England—the cradle of modern freedom, the type of modern order—should be found lengthening her cords and strengthening her stakes, rather than flying to pieces beneath the disruptive influence of one false economical idea ! Were her colonies to drift away from England the cause of liberty would sustain incalculable damage ; for the basis of well-ordered liberty is power and prestige, and of these attributes none of these young colonial communities can yet make boast. They need British rule in order that their immature political constitutions may gain strength, firmness, and maturity ; they need it to save them from anarchy, confusion, and possibly from despotism ; they need it to give them breathing time ere they are called

upon to discharge the onerous responsibilities of supreme power.

The long annals of the world are but a record of the rise and fall of successive empires. "Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, where are they?" Is the British empire now, ere scarce its limits are understood, to be numbered with the things that were but are not? Is England to part with her possessions, and become once more a second-rate power, with interests bounded by the seas that wash her shores? This is the question which now has to be answered, and which her statesmen are called upon to consider.

THE END

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